JPRS 77605

17 March 1981

USSR Report

POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS

No. 1110

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Damascus AL-BA'TH in Arabic 6, 13, 29 Jan 81

/Article: "The Round Table: Toward Continued and Strengthened Friendship and Cooperation between Syrian Arab Republic and Soviet Union/

/6 Jan 81 pp 6, 7/

/Text/ In the symposium on Syrian Arab-Soviet relations, and in other subsequent symposia, AL-BA'TH has aspired to emerge a little from its parochialism at a time which it is preparing itself to achieve further development and progress in the level of journalistic material and in forms for presenting it.

If the symposium on Soviet-Syrian Arab relations has been the entree to a subsequent series of dialogues and presentation of friendly ideas supportive of the Arab position and just struggle, that is because our relations with the Soviet Uion have come in recent moments to possess a special character which has been imposed by a long experience of cooperation and mutual trust on numerous political, economic and military horizons.

The Soviet comrades participating in the symposium cast light on the history of that relationship and analyze the stages of its escalation and development in the same spirit of friendship which embraces the two friendly peoples in Syria and the Soviet Union. Perhaps the real golden age has been that in which the comrade and fighting man Hafiz al-Asad, secretary general of the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party and president, has led the stage of Syrian political action, in which the features of this special character to which we referred have become apparent at a time in which the imperialist onslaught in the Arab region and along its borders, led by the United States of America, has reached a serious limit with which the issue of restoring balance to the forces in the region has become a matter of utmost importance.

The treaty of friendship and cooperation between Syria and the Soviet Union has taken place to this end, and it is for this reason that the intrigues of the adversary are growing in the face of it.

AL-BA'TH's Correspondent: We have called for this meeting in order thoroughly to study the real nature and the development of relations between the two friendly countries of Syria and the Soviet Union. These relations have always, in their historic course, represented a rising curve and today are achieving a qualitative strategic turing point, inaugurated by the treaty of friendship and cooperation between the two countries.

At the beginning, let us orient ourselves toward history. Orientation toward history is the cornerstone of any scientific discussion of platforms. In this endeavor, let us try to rely on a stage-by-stage time breakdown of these relations, from the early moments of our era to today.

Could Comrade Fomin inaugurate our round table discussions?

Fomin: Let me begin the discussion on this issue. The other comrades, most of whom have been in Syria and can enrich the discussion with their impressions and personal observations, can follow up.

We in the Soviet Union have always been in sympathy with Syria, and our friendship and sympathy with you have been known throughout history. Old Russia cooperated with Syria in the past in the cultural field, especially through the well known activity of the Russian-Palestinian Society on the territory of Syria and Lebanon (as it is called now), and to this day buildings remain in some areas of Syria which were built in their time by Russian Orthodox missionaries, who taught the Syrians the Russian language and other pedagogical matters. Today in Syria you can find some people who studied in those schools.

In the Soviet Union, we appreciate Syria's great contribution to world civilization and its qualitative weight in the national liberation movement of the Arab people as a whole. It is the Syrians, specifically, who began to expel the Crusaders from Arab territory, and they were in fact expelled from it. Afterward, Syria embarked on a merciless struggle against French colonialism and French imperialism. Syria today is considered a pioneer in the field of the development of Soviet-Arab relations, and I would like in general to refer to the fact that since the beginning ours have been model exemplary relations, and this good beginning has been reflected subsequently on the overall development of our friendly relations.

I believe that we can try to divide the history of Soviet-Syrian relations into a number of stages, starting with the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries in July 1944 and going up to today.

However, it is worth our while first to pause a moment before the great October socialist revolution. This revolution was the prelude to and the beginning of Soviet-Arab relations in general.

I consider that the Orientalist scholar Comrade Lebedev is the best one to talk to us on this subject, because of his broad knowledge of it; after that, we can move on to the stage-by-stage categorization of our relations with Syria in particular.

Lebedev: At the start of my intervetnion, it is necessary to point out that the thoughts of the great freedom-loving October socialist revolution spread rapidly over all corners of the Arab world. A great revolution-inspiring effect was made on the Arab people by the Leninist decree on peace which exposed the policy of imperialist depradation and called for the principle of the free and independent evolution of all peoples. The same effect was made by the Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia, which called for the peoples' rights and freedoms to determine their destiny and the abrogation of concessions and complications.

The appeal of the People's Delegated Council to all Moslem Working People in Russia and the East, which Lenin signed and which spoke of the inviolability and freedom of the national and cultural beliefs, customs and institutions of the Moslems, was translated into Arabic and met with a wide echo and great support on the part of the Arabs.

The Soviet government's exposure of the secret agreements signed by the imperialist countires in 1916 on the subdivision of areas of influence in the Arab East enjoyed great importance; the Soviet government thus warned the Arabs of the danger threatening them, and the publication of the provisions of the treaty was an incentive for the continued escalation of the struggle against colonialism thereafter.

Thus the great Arab world rose up to struggle for the sake of a new life and social progress and against colonial imperialist enslavement of peoples.

In the new historic circumstances created by the October revolution, it was no longer possible for the imperialist countries overtly to occupy the Arab lands which before 1918 were under the dominance of the colonial empire. Therefore they invented a new form for enslaving peoples which they termed the mandate system.

By delegation of the League of Nations, England imposed its "protection" on Iraq, Palestine and Transjordan, and France imposed its "protection" on Syria and Lebanon. The United States benefited from the open door policy in these regions placed under the mandate.

The Soviet government stood as a resolute adversary of the mandate system, and that is the position which it expressed more than once in its successive diplomatic memoranda to international conferences. Even when the Soviet Union joined the League of Nations in 1934, it stressed its firm position regarding Article 22 of the league charter, which summarized the basic provisions of the mandate system.

Although, in the period between the two wars, the Soviet Union was the only socialist country in the world, and for a number of objective reasons was not able to offer material assistance to the Arab liberation movement, the Soviet Union offered great political support to this movement and led the campaign to defend the peoples of the Middle East and North Africa and support their just struggle against imperialist settlement and colonial exploitation. The Soviet Union exposed to the whole world the imperialist countries' conspiracies aimed at incorporating the Arab countries into their areas of influence, usurping their resources and using them for the purposes of their personal benefit.

The foreign political steps which the Soviet Union took on behalf of the Arab countries in the stage between the two world wars continuously helped develop and strengthen the position of the domestic national forces. The /line missing/ belief of the Arab revolutionaries in the correctness of the road they had chosen grew, the forces which prepared the circumstances for liquidating the

colonial methods of administration ripened in the Arab world, and the preliminaries were prepared for the renaissance of the Arab nation in the future.

Fumin: Let me follow up on my discussion, if you will permit me, on the stage-by-stage breakdown of relations between our two countries and pause briefly at the first stage, or, more correctly, at the threshhold of the first stage.

In the wake of self-sacrificing national struggle which the Syrian Arab people embarked on against colonialism, France, in 1943, approved the independence of Syria, and as of 1 January 1944 transferred the powers of the mandate authorities to the Syrian government, promising to withdraw its armies.

After World War Two had come to an end, Syria, emulated by Lebanon, demanded immediate evacuation of foreign armies from its territories and since it did not receive a satisfactory answer, the governments of Syria and Lebanon ventured to appeal to the United Nations organization for a ruling on the subject of the dispute. The complaint of Syrian and Lebanon was discussed in the Secutiry Council on 15 and 16 February 1946 and the representatives of Britain and France declared that the time had not yet come for the withdrawal of their armies from Syria and Lebanon.

The representative of the Soviet Union supported the demand of Syria and Lebanon and demanded the withdrawal of the foreign forces from their territories at once. However, the Security Council did not accept this demand. After that, the representative of the United States spoke, supporting the representatives of the two colonial countries and the countries linked to them. He presented the draft of a resolution according to which France and Britain would essentially be able to delay on the matter of the withdrawal of the forces or demand compensation for the withdrawal of their forces in the form of unequal waivers, concessions, agreements and so forth.

The Soviet delegate opposed the draft resolution the Americans presented, using the right of the veto, and the draft was therefore considered rejected by the Security Council. Ultimately, England and France agreed to accept the Soviet offer to negotiate with Syria and Lebanon to determine dates and means for withdrawing the forces, and negotiations actually did take place in March of that year in Paris, concluding with the signing of a number of agreements, by virtue of one of which the last French soldier was withdrawn from Syria soil on 16 April 1946.

Thus Soviet diplomacy played a positive role in ridding Syria of the presence of the imperialist occupation in its territories, and the Syrian people still remember that and thank the Soviet people for their support.

The first stage began, then, with the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, as we mentioned above, in 1944, and made itself manifest with Soviet diplomacy's support for the cause of Syrian independence in the United Nations organization and in its institutions.

In the fifties a new stage appeared; this stage extended to 1963, when the following stage began, with the arrival of the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party to power and

the isolation of feudal and bourgeois circles from the regime. Naturally a quantum leap occurred in our relations during this period. After that there came 23 November 1966. [Two lines missing here.] Here relations between our two countries developed in a more general, comprehensive fashion, and a start was made on the establishment of massive joint economic projects, in particular the Euphrates Dam.

Then after that a new stage was witnessed, accompanying the establishment of the Corrective Movement under the leadership of President Hafiz al-Asad, secretary general of the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party, on 16 November 1970. This movement declared itself to be a continuation and extension of the 23 February movement.

In the 10 years which followed the Corrective Movement, our relations continued to develop increasingly; these relations have been crowned in the current stage by the signing of the treaty of friendship and cooperation between the two countries.

These are the most important stages which our relations have gone through, in my opinion, and, if we agree on that, we can go into detailed discussion of any stage we deem it appropriate to place under the microscope of analysis and thorough study.

AL-BA'TH's correspondent: This is an acceptable point of view to us all, because it proceeds from a clear comprehension of the historic characteristics of the development of the two countries, and determines the prominent events in the life of our Syrian Arab nation basically in the establishment of the time framework of each stage. If we are agreed in our opinions on this stage-by-stage classification, let us continue by hearing the opinion of Prof Oganesyan, in the context of whose scholarly research enter the issues of the development of Syria and the Arab liberation movement.

Oganesyan: I believe that this stage-by-stage breakdown is acceptable, as it relies on specific historic facts. One can actually consider the beginning of the first stage of Soviet relations to be 1944, that is, the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, but I consider that we should expand this stage to 1958, before Syria's inclusion in the United Arab Republic. This stage is characterized by the fact that our relations existed with an independent Syrian state but that the power at that time was concentrated in the hands of the feudal bourgeoisie, which left its mark on our relations. Here I mean that mutual economic relations occupied the prime position in our overall relations; as far as political relations went, they assumed a simplied form, appearing in the form of political moral support we offered to Syria so that it could preserve and consolidate its independence. Here we should single out for mention the stage of the fifties and the challenges in the years 1956 and 1957, when the Western countries' pressures on Syrian became intensified. In this process, they used Turkey and some puppet regimes; however, these pressures stopped with Syria's departure from the United Arab Republic and the secession period began, lasting for a relatively short period, up to 1963. At that time our relations were roughly marked by the same character with which they had been marked before the establishment of the United Arab Republic.

However, everything changed on 8 March 1963, when the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party took over the reins of power. We know that the history of Syria is replete with military coups, to the point where the year 1949 alone witnessed three military coups. However, this time the matter did not resemble a military coup -- rather, there was a revolution, and there was a qualitatively new situation in Syria, meaning, exactly, that forces expressing the interests of the popular masses had come to power for the first time. Therefore, the nature of Soviet-Syrian relations immediately changed in a noticeable fashion.

While the basic content before this period was restricted to economic cooperation, as I noted above, the situation has now changed: political relations have come to occupy the primary place, and this tendency was strengthened after 23 February 1966 when the left-wing democratic tendency triumphed, particularly after 16 November 1970.

Here, we observe a purely new stage which we had not previously experienced in the history of Soviet-Syrian relations. The distinguishing feature of this stage was the establishment of relations between the two parties, the Soviet Communist Party and the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party, alongside political, government and economic relations; this in fact was a new turning point. Relations between our two parties give our relations a more stable character, giving them the incentive to continue and develop in an amazing fashion.

In reality, the seventies constitute a new, distinctive stage in the history of our relations, since it is manifestly clear here that all the links in the relationships between the two countries, be they political, governmental or economic, are continuously working. This includes cooperation in the military field, where the Soviet Union is providing aid to Syria to stand up against the neo-Nazis and American imperialism, and there are many items of evidence -- the June 1967 war, then the October 1973 war. Syria, thanks to the support of the Soviet Union, was able, just as 'Abd-al-Nasir's Egypt previously had been able, to strike out at the strategic goals which the United States and Israel had set forth in order to liquidate the progressive regimes in the Arab east. However, these objectives were not realized, and the two fighting countries managed to defend their peoples' social and economic achievements.

The just October war of liberation deserves a long, contemplative pause.

AL-BA'TH's correspondent: The Russian maxim which holds "It is better that you should see once than that you should hear a hundred times" is apropos. We have an Arabic maxim which says "Your close neighbor, not your distant brother."

From the wisdom of these two maxims, we may deduce the importance of an abstract examination of reality and a real intimate experience with events. Here it would be beneficial for us to hear the view of a distinguished observer who has visited our country more than once, in 1965, 1968, 1970, 1973 and 1977, living through the most important events going on in the current stage of the historic development of our country.

Could Comrade Koryavin discuss his views and impressions with us?

Koryavin: I am in agreement with my collegue Prof Oganesyan in his assertion that a qualitative new stage in our relations began with the 1966 celebration, and was basically focused in the establishment of the Corretive Movement in Syria in 1970. The truth is that the shadow of this movement has been felt in all fields and areas, including the military one.

Here talk about the military field is very important, since in the seventies and before, specifically in 1967 and 1973, Syria faced extremely grave trials, related in particular to the Israeli aggression.

We went through this stage as eyewitnesses and as journalists who have stayed for a long period in the Middle East. It had previously been fixed in our minds that Syria was a country where "changes in the guard" were constantly taking place, as we wrote -- that is, where governments were changing, coups followed one another periodically, and what one could consider the most important element in the development of any country, stability, was absent.

However, matters were turned on their head with the 1966 celebration, in major form after 1970, when the most important element with which the situation in Syria could be characterized became its domestic stability. Perhaps some pehnomena of a purely temporary domestic nature occurred as regards Syria, but there remains the important thing, which is that the country has become more stable and confident of itself and of the power of its ability to stand up to aggression, and it began to stand in the first ranks of the national liberation movement.

Here I would like to go back a little and pause before the "oil issue" in Syria, which has absorbed my interest for a long time. It is well known that Syria's oil reserves are meager when compared with those of other Arab oil-producing countries such as Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states and other countries; however, that ceases to be the most important element when we shed light on the oil policy Syria has pursued. The most important element, in my opinion, is that the Syrian Arab Republic has been in the vanguard of those propounding the slogan "Arab oil for the Arabs," so that oil may be liberated from its subservience to the imperialist monoplies and so that oil may become a basic pillar for the development of the domestic economy and the development of the other productive sectors necessary for the establishment of a modern state, not just a means for devouring petrodollars.

Now, when I thumb through the books of my observations and writings, this "squabble" which took place between Syria and the Iraq Petroleum Company comes to my memory. At that time the newspaper FINANCIAL TIMES wrote, stating, in blunt phrases:

"Either the Syrian government agrees to the numbers which the Iraq Petroleum Company has imposed, or it must leave power." Imagine the tone with which a respected English newspaper was speaking in those years! However, I am confident that it cannot talk to Syria in that tone today, because Syria today is proceeding in the front ranks of the national liberation movement.

After that there occurred the June 1967 aggression, which explained the statement of the English newspaper; the strategic objective of that aggression actually was to bring down the progressive national regimes in the Arab world and tighten the

imperialist consortia's grip over the oil producing countries; however, none of that happened, and Syria emerged from this trial able to preserve its progressive transformations and its determined progress toward the construction of a new life. After that, other qualitative changes occurred in the Arab map, which can be the object of subsequent discussion and detailed analysis.

Participants in the Symposium

The academician Mikhail Kondakov, vice president of the USSR Academy of Pedagogical Sciences, corresponding memeber of the Soviet Academy of Sciences.

Dr Oleg Fomin, Deputy Chairman of the Soviet-Syrian Friendship Society, doctor in the philosophy of history.

Prof Nikolai Oganesyan, chief of Arab Countries Division, Institute of Oriental Studies of the Soviet-Armenian Academy of Sciences, doctor in historial sciences.

The journalist, Leonid Rassadin, chief commentator of Moscow Radio.

Dr Yevgeniy Lebedev, Arab Countries Department chief, Institute of Oriental Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences, doctor in the philosophy of history.

The journalist Leonid Koryavin, member of the editorial board of the newspaper IZVESTIA and head of the newspaper's Asian, African and Latin American countries section.

Igor Molchanov, chief of Arab Division of Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries.

/13 January 81 pp 7, 8/

In the first part of the AL-BA'TH symposium, "the issue of Arab-Soviet relations, a model of international relations of a new kind," the development of relations between the two countries and their entry into the stage of diplomatic relations in 1944 were reviewed, along with the manner in which Britain imposed its "protection," by delegation from the League of Nations, over Iraq, Palestine and Transjordan, and France its "protection" over Syria and Lebanon, and the manner in which America proceeded with the oepn door policy. The Soviet government stood as a determined adversary of the mandate system.

The people taking part in the symposium discussed how relations entered into a new stage with the fifties, up to 1963, when the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party took over and the feudalists and reactionaries were isolated.

Relations proceeded in a direct fashion with the establishment of projects, but witnessed a new stage, which accompanied the Corrective Movement led by President Hafiz al-Asad, the secretary general of the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party, on 16 November 1970.

Relations in the 10 years following the Corrective Movement developed, until the current stage, in which the treaty of friendship and cooperation was signed by the two countries.

AL-BA'TH is publishing the second portion of the symposium, as stated in the words of the people taking part in it.

AL-BA'TH's correspondent: Let us now start with a discussion of a new subject, which, I believe, is the most important of the subjects this symposium is dealing with. We can say that it is the most important issue in the discussions of our "round table," and we would like to turn the tiller of the discussion toward the treaty of friendship and cooperation between the Syrian Arab Republic and the Soviet Union. I state that this treaty was not born by coincidence but that it was a logical result of the state of an advanced movement reflecting the flourishing relations between the two countries and the growth of friendship between the two peoples. Therefore, the mass receptiveness toward the treaty in our country was splendid; no sooner did President al-Asad return to the country after signing the treaty than he received hundreds of cables and letters blessing this great, historic achievement. The masses embraced this as one of the most important events in the recent era of our development and no event or occasion takes place in our country now in which the treaty is not mentioned closely or remotely. Thus the treaty has truly become a manifestation of friendship and the beginning of a new evaluation of our relations. Here we would like to deal with the contents and importance of the treaty through investigation, discussion and analysis. Let us start with the legal status of the treaty. It is necessary to point out that the treaty, as a legal form, is to be considered one of the most advanced forms of contractual relations between countries in the context of modern international relations. In its palpable legal significance, it is a charter which brings together two friendly countries and determines their joint desires and commitments in accordance with a declared treaty text.

Pomin: If we talk in the language of international law, a treaty is generally a form for expressing will between two countries, or among a number of countries; here it is an action agreed upon between our two countries, the Soviet Union and Syria, regarding their joint rights and obligations in political, economic and other fields.

History is acquainted with two forms of treaty relations, treaties of equality and treaties of inequality, or treaties which are biased regarding the two contracting parties.

As regards the capitalist countries, when they signed international treaties, especially in the past, they tried to impose their desire and their terms on the "weaker" countries, according to the prevailing bourgeois expression. The Arab countries know this from experience, since history reminds us of many examples in which agreements biased against the rights of numerous Arab countries were imposed. Examples of this are the treaties whose contents were declared following the triumph of the great October socialist revolution, the Franco-Syrian treaty of 1936, the Franco-Lebanese treaty of the same year, and so forth.

Conversely, there is the treaty system of socialist countries which base their treaty relations on the sovereignty of both parties, on mutual benefits, and on nonintervention in one another's internal affairs. This has had a great effect on international practice in the field of treaty agreements, and in general, when

a capitalist country concludes a treaty today with a developing country, which to some degree is reasonable that is not happening in isolation from the effect of the existence of the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist system.

The Soviet-Syrian treaty is in agreement in letter and spirit with the constitutional and legislative systems of both countries. Agreement was made to it, and it was signed, during the visit by the secretary general of the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party, the president of the Syrian Arab Republic, Hafiz al-Asad, to the Soviet Union; after that, the treaty was subjected to the legislative procedures in effect in both countries. On 14 November 1980 the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet held a meeting chaired by Leonid Brezhnev, secretary general of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party and chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, and approved the conclusion of the treaty, and Leonid Brezhnev signed the document on the conclusion. At this session the member of the Politbureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party and minister of foreign affairs of the Soviet Union, Andrei Gromyko, spoke on behalf of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, which recommended that the treaty be concluded and stressed that the treaty was one of equality in all its aspects, was equally beneficial to the Soviet Union and the Syrian Arab Republic, and, in its totality, was in agreement with the constitution of the Soviet Union, the United Nations charter and the principle of peaceful constructive cooperation between peoples.

Stress was laid more than once during Comrade Hafiz al-Asad's visit to Moscow, and in the comments which followed the signing of the treaty, on the fact that it was a treaty in the name of peace and the liquidation of the abyss of armed struggle. However, what is essential here is that the talk revolve about a just peace; the treaty was signed for the sake of a just peace, and this is present in the minds of public opinion in all corners of the world.

Since our struggle has been the same, since we have, as people are accustomed to saying in Syria, been fighting in one trench against imperialism and Zionism, and since the Soviet Union is leading the struggle against imperialism and reaction all along the front, it is, at the same time, offering aid to Syria. When Syria wages the struggle against imperialism and Zionism, and stands in the vanguard of this struggle in the Middle East, it is making its contribution to the final triumph of the forces of socialism and social progress over the forces of imperialism and racism in their various manifestations and forms which are prejudiced against mankind.

Thus I can stress that this treaty, from the standpoint of international law, is an equal one of benefit to both parties.

Koryavin: I would like to talk about the strategic importance of this treaty and stress before all else the urgency of the treaty as far as the current international circumstances and its effect on them go. Above and beyond the fact that the treaty deals with the concerns of Syria and the Soviet Union, it is also to be considered, without a doubt, an element influencing the international situation as a whole. Why?

First, because it was concluded at a stage in which the international situation was increasing in gravity and complexity.

Second, because of the fact that the vital nature of the treaty stands out regarding issues of peace and security in the region.

If we study the provisions of the treaty closely, we will find that both contracting parties will by various means help consolidate world peace, the security of peoples and the relaxation of international tension. Stress is laid on this issue in Article Two of the treaty.

If we take Article Three, the two contracting parties proceed from the premise of belief in the equality of all peoples and countries, regardless of race and belief. They condemn imperialism, racism and Zionism as an embodiment of racism; the import of this article is of extreme significance, because we made a tour through history a short time ago and spoke about our war and your war, stressing, in the context of it, that many historic factors correspond in spite of the difficulty of comparison. Our emphasis on considering Zionism a form of racism and comparing it with the Hitlerite racist theory was not haphazard.

Here we also lay stress on the importance of the struggle against imperialism and the total and final liquidation of colonialism. We will soon be celebrating the 20th anniversary of the international declaration on the grant of independence to colonized peoples which, at its time, was a great event. Can you see how the map of the world has changed in 20 years and how the map of Asia and the maps of the other awakened continents have changed? African peoples accepted this declaration with great enthusiasm because it stressed the total liquidation of colonialism, and today the combatants of Namibia and the partisans of South Africa are fighting to this end for the sake of the freedom of their nations and the happiness of their peoples.

I do not want to stray from the focus of the matter, but I wanted to stress, through my previous review, that the treaty nonetheless is becoming an important factor which has its effect and its contribution in prompting and enlarging the processes of national liberation in the world.

It is necessary, finally, to pause before the importance of the treaty with respect to the situation in the Middle East. I can say that the treaty calls for a purification of the situation in this region, especially since the aggressive operations which Israel is carrying out against Lebanon are continuous and it is continuing to stress its expansionist aspirations, examples of which are the "incorporation" of Jeursalem and its overt talk about "incorporating" the Golan Heights, which they have planted with "green districts," with the intention of saying that they are staying on this territory. The farms which they have established there are not aimed at harvesting certain crops but are an implantation of the feet of aggression on the land of others. When we talk about that in our writings, we say that these cultivated areas do not symbolize land which has been bestowed but are signs of occupation of the Golan Heights.

There is also another matter, which is the Americans' attempt to consolidate their military presence in the area and warm their hands on the fire of the Iraq-Iranian conflict, a conflict which is of no benefit in terms of the theory of the process of national liberation, since it is directing forces in other than their proper directions and the muzzles of cannons are turning in an opposite direction. To

state it bluntly, both parties have tremendous resources which they have not mobilized against imperialism or for the sake of defending the area against designs; rather, these resources are being directed toward bloody destruction, although it would have been possible to unleash them into the current of the struggle against American infiltration — I am not saying for the sake of launching a war, which is not the issue.

The element of peaceful coexistence and the unity of countries in the Arab and Islamic world remain the main obstacle and barrier in the way of the imperialist forces; unfortunately this unity is today being demolished to the advantage of imperialism.

I can conclude with the statement that the treaty is a brilliant symbol of relations of a new type, relations between the first triumphant socialist country and the country which is progressing in the first ranks of the national liberation movement hostile to imperialism.

Therefore the treaty between the two friendly countries is to be considered a source of the pride and glory of all of us.

Kondakov: I would like, after our review of the international importance of the treaty, to stress its bilateral importance and its Arab importance; the Soviet and Syrian leaders, proceeding from their mutual desire to consolidate fruitful relations between the Soviet Union and the Syrian Arab Republic in all their numerous aspects and raise these relations on a legal basis to a more advanced level, have decided to conclude a treaty of friendship and cooperation between our two countries.

This treaty, which was signed by Comrades Hafiz al-Asad and Leonid Brezhnev, is a document of extreme importance, aimed at joint mutually-beneficial Syrian-Soviet cooperation and the consolidation of Syria's position of hostility toward imperialism. With the signing of this treaty, the Soviet Union is once again expressing its loyalty to its platform, from which no considerations of personal interests will deter it.

In the speech with Leonid Brezhnev, secretary general of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party and chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union, made during the reception held in honor of President Hafiz al-Asad, he resolutely declared "the Soviet Union has responded and is responding with determination to those who threaten the security of the Arab countries and peoples and try to impose occupationist usurpationist conspiracies upon them, threaten them with their military bases, and send warships to their coasts, and those who use for the purposes of their benefit the abyss of conflict in this region."

It is no coincidence that many of the media in the Arab countries have written to express Arab masses' deep feelings by stating that the Soviet-Syrian treaty is a living expression of the hand of friendship which the Soviet Union has extended to the Arabs and the guarantee of its support and backing for them in their struggle for the honor of the Arab nation and the security of the Arab land and resources.

Rasadin: In talking about the treaty, let me begin from the contrary sense, to state who is standing against the treaty, attacking it and trying to create a misunderstanding and misinterpretation of it, and why. However, at first I will proceed from a discussion on the positive aspects of the treaty, which one can talk about at length, though I will summarize these positive matters in three points:

The first point: the treaty strengthens Syria's position in confronting Israeli aggression and Israeli expansion policy.

The second point: the treaty has become a preventive deterrent to the implementation of imperialist conspiracies, especially American ones, and to the implementation of the Camp David schemes. Implementation of these schemes has become a harder task, following the signing and conclusion of the treaty.

The third point: the special importance of the treaty, in the actual conditions of the current Arab and international situation — especially since, as has been said here, American war equipment is being sent to the Near and Middle East, especially the Gulf area.

The treaty, in my opinion, has become an element deterring those who conjure up dreams of acting with presumption against the independence of the other countries in the region.

As regards those who are standing against the treaty, it would be excellent if I brought in some statements so that matters could be in their place. Let me start with the United States. American officials have adhered to caution in their statements from the beginning, but the matter becomes clearer if we review the orientations of the American newspapers, the news agencies and radio and television networks. Not long ago the ASSOCIATED PRESS agency wrote "The treaty is to be considered just a psychological gambit on Syria's part for the sake of standing up to Israeli aggression."

A psychological gambit and nothing else? This is the deduction which the Americans have reached, and in itself it is an attempt to misinterpret the role of the treaty and belittle its significance.

In another area, the Americans themselves are compelled to acknowledge the fact that Syria has never been stronger than it is now, and the correspondents now present in Syria, who have come there as representatives of the ASSOCIATED PRESS, UPI and the other agencies, find themselves compelled to acknowledge this fact.

The Israeli reaction, in my opinion, also deserves attention. In a statement he made last 11 November, we find Begin stating that the treaty is a very serious step against Israel and declaring openly that this treaty is against Israel's aggressive policy — but naturally he does not use the words aggression, expansion and the like because he refuses to call things by their real names.

What is also odd is the Egyptian reaction, especially the reaction of the Egyptian press. Let us take the newspaper AL-AHRAM, whose editor in chief, in the article he published on 17 October 1980, tried to make inflammatory propaganda against the

contents of the treaty, considering it — and here we quote his words — "a great step in realizing the Soviet Union's dream of establishing a new Afghanistan among the Arab countries," speaking about the "readiness" of what he described as the Syrian regime to "sell everything for the sake of staying in power" and stating that the Soviet Union "has acquired a new square in the chess game in the struggle with the United States."

Koryavin: Put briefly, the writer wanted to talk about al-Sadat in this article, but by changing names and titles.

Rassadin: Indeed. However, that emphasizes another fact; if the imperialist and Zionist enemies and the Egyptian regime are attacking the treaty, that means that it has struck its target and is annoying them greatly.

However, the statements which I have cited are only a surplus of the surplus — there are dozens and dozens of statements and remarks which are starting to be repeated and continued besides them. In general, there is nothing astonishing in the fact that Western propaganda is thus trying, as it has tried before, to sabotage relations between Syria and the Soviet Union, and will continue in this error by various ways and means, including some which will directly or indirectly defame the treaty on grounds that it does not coincide with the position of one side or the other, and so on and so forth.

I would also like to add that the people making these statements have not taken the care to read the treaty. As regards the attacks on Syria and the Soviet Union which allege that we have unchaste military and political goals, it is explicitly mentioned in Article Four of the treaty that the Soviet Union honors the policy of nonalignment which Syria is following, which is to be considered the most important element in the issue of maintaining and supporting world peace and security and reducing the severity of international tension. These expressions are clear and explicit and do not require comment.

From all the foregoing, we reach a useful conclusion, which is that the attack on the treaty is aimed only at defaming it and at detracting from its importance.

Oganesyan: There is an addition which I would like to make on Western provocations and propaganda, which try to make Syria appear as if it embarked on this treaty under the impulse of its domestic situation, although these circles know for certain that Syria has taken great strides along the road to consolidating its internal front and implanting its progressive detachments against conspiracies by the forces of domestic reaction.

The purpose behind these international fabrications is to cast a shadow on the truth and sincerity of the intentions of the Syrian party and to ignore Syria's strategic goal in the treaty, which the leaders of the party and the government in Syria have spoken about more than once.

This is an important point which draws one's attention because the counter-propaganda thereby wishes to devoid the treaty of its real content and cast doubt on its goals. These allegations offend the truth; Syria's true intentions are not besmirched by doubt — the stipulations of the treaty, in all of their letters, give proof of that.

Koryavin: The power of this treaty lies in the fact that it truly expresses real intentions and bears in its text the signature of the two countries to the realization that they are following fixed, continuous policies over a long period of time.

There is an observation which I might add on the position of the Egyptian regime. Although the treaty is not directed against other powers, we see that it appears to the Egyptian leaders to be a subjective factor which manifests itself in auctioneering over the issue of consolidating relations and horizons for cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Arab countries through treaties, agreements and so forth. The spirit and essence of the treaty, as we have previously mentioned, explode all these fraudulent statements.

AL-BA'TH's correspondent: In my opinion one of the most important sources of strength in this treaty remains the conviction of the masses in Syria and the Soviet Union alike in it; our leaders, by signing this treaty, have proceeded from their previous realization of the results of the mass vote on the treaty and have thus expressed the will of the broad masses in the two countries.

Fomin: This is true. All domestic progressive forces and parties, in the framework of the National Progressive Front — the Communist Party, the Socialist Union — have supported this step, and the National Progressive Front, in its meetings, has approved the treaty.

What merits attention is the fact that Zionism is mentioned twice in the treaty. The issue is confined to the fact that a large segment of world public opinion is in the Western countries, which lie under specific influence of Zionist propaganda and to a large degree do not realize the tragic state of the Palestinian Arab people, who were expelled from their homeland more than 30 years ago. [Several lines missing.]

Regardless of the fact that an international organization with a lofty status such as the United Nations has adopted a special resolution condemning Zionism as a form of racism, you see people in the Western countries, and some other countries, who are still unaware of the real nature of Zionism as a reactionary extremist racist movement constituting a threat to peace not just in the Middle East but also in the whole world through its hostile acts.

The discussion here revolves around Zionism, the adherents of a high-sounding fanatic idea. The Arabs have never been fanatic; we have all been in Syria and we know that Jews are living in Damascus and other towns today and that not a hair has fallen from the hair of any Jew, which emphasizes that the Arabs have never been anti-Semitic and have lived in peace alongside them for centuries.

Fomin: Thus, as we have said, emphasis is placed twice in the treaty on the need to struggle against Zionism. In the preamble it is stated that the Soviet Union and the Syrian Arab Republic are fully determined to stand against the policy of aggression which imperialism and its aides are practicing in a resolute fashion and to continue the struggle against old and new colonialism and against racism in all its forms and manifestations, including Zionism. Article Three of the treaty says that the two lofty contracting parties, out of belief in the equality of all

peoples and countries, regardless of race and regligion, condemn colonialism, Zionism and racism, of which it is a form and manifestation.

The fact that the condemnation of Zionism is included in an important international legal document like the treaty we are studying thoroughly and that the two countries are determined to stand up against it in all its forms is, without a doubt, to be considered a serious contribution to the struggle against these anti-human notions, and the fact that this is mentioned in the treaty is a matter of the utmost importance, because every treaty is a source of international law, which means that international law has once again been enriched by a new content, which is the matter of the urgent struggle against Zionism, which inflicts harm not only on the Arab peoples but alos on many other peoples in the world.

AL-BA'TH's correspondent: The treaty has placed the two countries' relations on the threshhold of a new stage, which is to be considered a quantitative strategic turning point in the history of these relations. It would be very nice if we paused, while we are intending to discuss the friendship treaty, at the horizons for the development of relations between our two countries in the coming stage.

Assadin: I would like to deal with the horizons of the development in Soviet-Syrian relations in the economic sphere. It is necessary to talk a little about the manner in which these relations developed in the past.

These relations had developed in a good manner even before the signing of the treaty. The treaty came only as a development, a deepening of and an incentive for these relations; the article of the treaty which stipulates that the two parties will help to deepen and expand economic, scientific and technical cooperation is very useful. Economic cooperation includes industry, agriculture, irrigation, water resources and the use of oil and other natural resources, and it contains the branches of transportation, communications and other fields of the economy.

As you see, the scope for economic cooperation is very broad. The most important thing, in my opinion, is that this help the resurgence and development of the Syrian domestic economy, especially the consolidation of the public sector; this indicates what distinguishes the nature of relations between our country and the other socialist countries and the developing countries, especially Syria, from the relations between the capitalist countries and what are called their partners in the fields of trade and economy in the developing world.

The Euphrates Dam remains the living example which expresses the nature of our cooperation. Power from the dam will provide more than 70 percent of the electric energy the country generates, and the dam will provide resources for irrigating 600,000 hectares of barren land. This means that Syria will be able to expand its agricultural exports, which is the object of the future, perhaps the near future.

We also are reading with great optimism of our cooperation in the field of oil. There is no need here to stress the vital importance of this economic field — it is sufficient for us to point out that the oil producing industry now provides

the major portion of the hard currency income of the country. We must strengthen our future cooperation in the field of establishing massive major projects such as the construction of big factories and plants which will help to implant the bases of modern industrialization. It is necessary for us, in our cooperation, to give great attention to the laying of railways, since we have past experience in this field, and the ambitious plans to expand the railway system in Syria are applied that will make a big contribution to linking up all parts of the country economically, socially and industrially.

We reach the conclusion that we have great resources for cooperating on a basis of good will and mutual benefit. Finally, I would like to point out that the development of economic relations is a two-way street; we in our turn are happy to receive certain traditional Syrian exports such as textiles, silk, light industries and so forth, and these exports must develop qualitatively and quantitatively in the future.

Koryavin: I would like to add some words on domestic industry and domestic staffs. I would like to recite to you the following fact: when we were in Beirut, working as journalists, people thrust a publication in English and in Arabic titled "Israel in the Year 2000 upon us." These publications were distributed to the bureaus of foreign correspondents and embassies on purpose by some well known forces.

As a result of that, at that time the article by the late Soviet journalist Mayevski appeared in PRAVDA exposing the essence of this publication, which wanted to provide that in 2000 Israel would become "a peaceful state which would become integrated through its relations with the Arab countries." The call was directed, as is apparent, to the Arab countries; the publication wondered why the Arab countries should turn to cooperation with the West, not to speak of relations with the Soviets, and ask them for teachers, doctors and military experts at a time when Israel exists alongside them and can provide the Arab countries with such specialists: we — the publication said — must combine Israel's expertise with the tremendous reserves of Arab resources and form a small metropolis which will impose its terms on the East and the West alike.

AL-BA'TH's correspondent: That publication must have fallen into al-Sadat's hands at that time!

Koryavin: Maybe so, because that is what they are doing now in Egypt; here appears the portrait of the old colonialism and the thinking of the old imperialism: if you offer us oil, form a tributary of raw materials for us, and supply us with cheap manpower, we will export brains to you!

This is precisely a skilful Zionist expansionist theory — a neocolonialist theory; therefore the creation of domestic personnel in the Arab world who are themselves able to run massive installations and projects becomes a very important matter for the development of an integrated economy.

I believe that wherever we have had joint projects between Syria and the Soviet Union, we have felt that the study courses established here are one of the fruits of cooperation between us — the Euphrates Dam has not just been an industrial

complex, it is also a great school for preparing domestic specialists, and in my opinion any professor or teacher who returns from Syria should feel proud to have contributed a modest portion to the matter of building domestic staffs. There are now close to 30,000 engineers and technicians who have been trained by contribution of the Soviet Union, and thus the issue of the training of domestic staffs has become one of the most important issues in the construction of a new life, and is at the same time an effective weapon in the struggle against Zionism and colonialism in its new and old forms.

Fomin: As regards the issue of brains, that at the present time is assuming an opposite trend. We see that people in Tel Aviv are now anxious in the face of the increasing number of Arab scientific specialists and researchers, especially Palestinians, whose number is many times greater than that of Israeli specialists. The Soviet Union is proud of its contribution and its part in training Arab staffs.

Lebedev: Let me talk a little bit about the horizons of our cooperation in the scientific field, as long as we are talking about the creation of technical staffs; this is a matter which is closely linked to the scientific aspect.

One element in the strengthening of of friendly relations between our two countries, I believe, is the scientific contacts, which have numerous facets and take place through the Soviet Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education and its Syrian counterpart, and to some extent through the Academy of Sciences.

The signing of the treaty will provide an opportunity for the conclusion of a scientific agreement between the two countries, and this is a matter which enters into the scope of our joint responsibilities.

As regards our scientific cooperation at the present time, everyone knows full well that many Syrian students are studying in the Soviet Union, including people studying with us in the Institute of Oriental Studies. We have had many students taking higher studies by correspondence and people who have defended their theses with exceptional success and are now working in many sensitive areas in the country. Five thousand Syrian students are now preparing to receive doctorates, they are now working seriously, and I believe that they will complete their studies with success.

The scientific works which we have published on Syria are more than can be counted, but I can mention some of the more important ones. Let me start with the books that have been published and translated into foreign languages, including the book "The Arabs, Islam and the Arab Caliphate" and "The Modern History of the Arabs" by the scholar Levitsky, which we published after his death, relying on his drafts, summaries and the lectures he gave at Moscow University. The book has been translated into Arabic and English.

After that, in 1961, there appeared the book "The Modern History of the Arab Countries," in Russian, which was then translated into Arabic and brought out in two volumes in 1971. The first volume was devoted to the Asian Arab countries and the second one to the African Arab countries.

A great event in scholarly life was also the emergence of the book "Modern Syria" which contains important scholarly reference material on the history and development of the Syrian Arab Republic, in olden and modern times.

In conclusion, I would like to state that we have just finished preparing the second printing of the book "Modern History of the Arab Countries" and that will see light in 1981.

The modern history of Syria will occupy an important portion of the material in the book.

Fomin: I would like to point to one other dimension of the development of our relations. In the treaty, there is also talk about the two countries' determination to develop cooperation in the field of the media (Article Nine).

Here there are journalists who have written dozens of times about Syria in Soviet newspapers, magazines and periodicals, in addition to television reportage, in particular the reportage by Comrade Rassadin, which was seen by 260 million Soviet viewers. In Syria, also, a large group of articles have been published on the Soviet Union and on the friendship between our two countries.

Thus our work in the field of the media is progressing in a parallel line; our "round table" today can be viewed as a point of departure in the field of the media, and a useful, desirable form of journalistic action. We can multiply these symposia in the future through the press of the two countries.

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/Text/ AL-BA'TH's correspondent: As I see it, our comrades' interventions are focused on giving prominence to the stage of the seventies in our history and the development of relations between two countries, which is a logical conception. In our country's life, this stage has been one of qualitative transition from experiments to options. As far as we are concerned, these years have not been a museum, they have been a workshop, a real workshop which has produced many achievements. New expressions have appeared in the dictionary of everyday political life: the November of correction, the October of liberation, the permanent constitution, the People's Assembly and the National Progressive Front. The option is that there is room only for progress and socialism in our country. Academician Kondakov has witnessed this stage through attention, followup and observations in the field. Could he speak to us of his views and impressions?

Kondakov: I have been in Syria three times, love that country with all my heart and love its splendid hospitable people, who are engaged in a heroic distinguished struggle on the front lines of the battle against imperialism, Zionism and reaction and for the sake of a free dignified life and social progress. The continuing platform of obvious hostility to imperialism which the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party is pursuing, and its sincere desire to expand friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union and the other Socialist countries, has always met with the support and backing of the Soviet peoples. This platform has also met with constant support on the part of the broad masses in Syria. However, the implacable stand which the Syrian Arab Republic is taking on the Camp David conspiracy,

its firm determination to liberate the occupied Arab territories and restore the usurped rights of the Palestinian Arab peoples, including their right to establish their independent state on their motherland, and the political moral support which Syria is providing to national democratic movements, have met with extreme indignation in the camp of enmity to the liberation and social progress of the peoples. It has happened that imperialism, Zionism and Arab reaction have coordinated their efforts in recent years for the sake of getting Syria to deviate from its announced platform of a Socialist face and compelling it to swerve from its fixed policy of principle of antagonism to imperialism.

These enemies have given free rein to political pressure, economic boycott and attempts to export counterrevolution through the "Moslem Brothers" and threats of direct armed intervention on Israel's side.

The Syrian Arab people's answer to the destructive activity which foreign and domestic enemies have been carrying out against the progressive regime in Syria has been to assert their determination to preserve the political and social triumphs they have realized, strengthen their domestic unity by strengthening the role of the Progressive National Front in all fields of life, and release the social and political activities of the broad masses in order to deepen the revolutionary process in the country.

Stress has been made at meetings of the central command of the National Progressive Front, at conferences of the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party, and at conferences of the front parties on the fact that subsequent development of friendship and cooperation with countries in the socialists system, headed by the Soviet Union, is a sure guarantee of the successes of the Syrian Arab people in the struggle to thwart the schemes of neoimperialism and for the sake of the freedom of their country and the whole Arab East.

Lebedev: Relations are progressing in this direction among the major parties in Syria. The Progressive National Front was established in 1972; in its charter it is stated that it was formed "as a preliminary step along the road to unification of the detachments of the Arab revolution in Syria, which is to be considered an urgent necessity in the current phase for mobilizing forces and supporting the domestic front in the face of the vicious Zionist imperialist attack." It was stated that this front was formed "in order to deepen the cooperation of the masses who have real interests in revolution and development, to deepen democracy, and to cause the innovative powers of the masses to burst forth." The vanguard forces in the Arab world have always enjoyed the support of the Soviet Communist Party and the Soviet government in the struggle against the intervention of other forces in their domestic affairs, and PRAVDA has written "The Soviet Communist Party considers that its goal is to strengthen the cooperation of the forces of socialism and national liberation on grounds of mutual interest, for the sake of standing up to the divisive tactics which imperialist and reactionary circles practice, and for the sake of real unity in daily practice directed against imperialism and toward peace, liberation and social justice."

Koryavin: I consider it proper for us to pause, if you permit, before one of the great events of the seventies in Damascus — October 1973 and the great tribulation it was our fortune, mine and that of Comrade Fomin, to be there, and

my personal reminiscences as a journalist are with me now. I was a little late and arrived after the start of the war, on that tragic day when the Israeli Phantom aircraft flew over Damascus and bombed civilian targets, and the bombing hit the Soviet Cultural Center.

Fomin: They later tried to justify this act of theirs on grounds that they wanted to bomb military targets but in reality wanted to bomb civilian areas, and they actually did so.

Koryavin: These were in fact the justifications of Israeli propaganda. When the Soviet Cultural Center was bombed, the Soviet teacher Galincheva was martyred. Let us state here explicitly that our friendship has confirmed this example by blood; we later buried this woman in Moscow. She was a participant in the great national war of 1941-45. Also martyred was the Arab jurist Muhammad Amin. In the course of the October 1973 war, a qualitative change occurred in the psychology of the Arab countries, since an end was put to the myth of "the Israeli army that cannot be defeated" in Syria specifically. We relaize that more than anyone else because we went through this state of affairs in the great national war and we remember the Hitlerite theory on "the German military machine which cannot be defeated" and its reliance on the theory of blitzkrieg (lightning war). It is not by coincidence that we are making this comparison here. The myth of the "Israeli army which cannot be defeated" was crushed, on the Syrian front specifically, and we saw with our own eyes the destruction of the Phantom aircraft which fell near Damascus in 1973, saw the blows raining down on the tank divisions which tried to make a breakthrough to Damascus but could not, and saw the heroic struggle of Syrian citizens in the popular army who readied themselves to defend Damascus and other areas with exceptional discipline. If we now look at the past of the development of all these events, we will see the stability and continuity of Syria's policies of principle on issues connected to the Middle East crisis, their refusal to bargain for a separate deal at Camp David, and their desire to solve the Middle East problem in all its manifestations -- before all else, the withdrawal of Israeli forces from all occupied Arab territories and satisfaction of the legitimate demands of the Palestinian Arab people. This is not a position of words, it is a position of deeds.

The Egyptian regime is taking a contradictory stance, trying to thwart the important positive results of the October war and play with the cards of the issue as a whole; today all Egypt is being turned into an American military base.

The issue may be summarized by the fact that the United States is now trying to infiltrate into the Middle East, not just through the presence of its fleet in Arab waters and the presence of some of its air fighting forces in specific military bases -- it wants the concentration and mobilization of whole brigades preparatory to transferring them to areas of war operations under the excuse that the Soviet Union is threatening this area.

These are the reasons for the American presence in Egypt and the region. It is not by chance that in our press and in the progressive press of the West the expression "nation base" has appeared by which we mean Egypt, since the Americans want to concentrate tens of thousands of military personnel there in order to transfer them en masse to fight against Iran and against other countries in that region.

AL-BA'TH's correspondent: I believe that we are right in pausing at length before the October war of liberation, because this war put positions under bright sunlight — the positions of the people who stand alongside aggression and the position of the people who stand alongside the victims of aggression.

Fomin: The days of October are not absent from my memory. During them, the high spirit and perseverance of the Syrian Arab people made themselves manifest — the perseverance of Damascus and the other towns. On 9 October 1973, some Phantom aircraft managed to penetrate the air over Damascus and their objective was to bomb civilians.

On 11 October, I saw with my own eyes in Damascus how the Syrian air defense managed to bring down close to 80 Israeli aircraft along the front lines. That was tantamount to revenge for the crime which the Israeli "crows" carried out; it stirred up unparalleled enthusiasm among the people of Damascus and it was not in their capability to hide their happiness with the Syrian combatants and their skill, since they managed to see that directly in the air.

Rassadin: If I can speak about my personal recollections, I can remember an important moment. I had the chance to travel to Syria for the first time in 1974, that is, after the October war of liberation. I remember full well that that was one of my first trips to Damascus, specifically in December 1974, when my Syrian comrades advised me to visit the War Museum. I responded to the advice and visited it, and I recall that we met there with a group of pupils and their teachers, who had brought them to the museum, after classes were over in school to recite to them the story of the October war a year after it had taken place with living evidence.

The teacher started to recite the events and spoke about the solidarity, the stands and the heroic acts. Believe me, for 2 or 3 hours I could not go out of there; a real, long discussion took place with the pupils and the teacher. The children, who were no more than 13 or 14 years old, asked us dozens of questions about our country and our relations, and I was amazed by their awareness and their great interest in our country and the development of our relations.

I have another example. I remember when I was at the Euphrates Dam. Unfortunately, I was not present at the start of the construction of the dam, but I was there at the end, in 1978. At that time I traveled to the dam and everything was ready for the inauguration ceremonies. Many conversations took place between us and between the Syrians and the Soviets working there, and I felt wherever I went a spirit of friendly human relations and a spirit of desire for cooperation and joint action.

In a word, the spirit of real friendship was deepened through the projects of friendship, foremost of which was the Euphrates project. Here a conversation occurs to me which took place between the Soviets and the Syrians at a meeting, in which the specialists said clearly, "Our task here is confined to handing the keys over to the Syrians. It is a Syrian dam on Syrian soil, and we are always ready to help you and cooperate with you.

"However, the keys must remain in your hands, and you will administer this dam with your hands."

AL-BA'TH's correspondent: The Syrian Arab-Soviet and Soviet-Syrian Friendship Societies are striving seriously to deepen and develop friendship between the two countries on a broad mass scale. The activity of the two societies enjoys great appreciation on the part of the leaders and the people of both countries. Could Comrade Molchanov, chief of the Arab Division of the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship, talk to us about that in detail?

Molchanov: It would be worthwhile for me to point out, first, that this round table which is gathering Syrian and Soviet journalists together is taking place in the Press Building. There is nothing surprising about this, since most of the people taking part in this symposium are members of the friendship societies in both countries. Here I would like to point out that there are a number of agreements between the Soviet Union and Syria, but the first of these agreements to be concluded and in which the use of the word "friendship" appears often was the agreement signed by the Friendship Societies in Syria and the Soviet Union. The basic principles stipulated by the agreement now find an embodiment in the treaty signed by the two countries.

The best proof of that is that the signing of the treaty was accompanied by spontaneous meetings in Soviet organizations, authorities and installations to bless this treaty. An enormous mass meeting also took place in the Institute of Water Design in Moscow. Those who met sent a telegram of support for the treaty which they sent to the Syrian Arab-Soviet Friendship Society.

The conclusion of the treaty opens new horizons before us and lays new tasks on our shoulders. The friendship societies in our country are exerting maximum effort to acquaint public opinion in the Soviet Union and Syria with the Soviet Union's historic experience and expertise in building socialism on the one hand and the successes and victories which the Syrian Arab people are winning in their difficult struggle on the other.

Fomin: I can add a little to the role of Syrian-Soviet friendship, which is part of Arab-Soviet friendship and Soviet-Arab friendship. It is not a coincidence that imperialism, Zionism and Arab reaction as embodied in the Sadatist regime are trying most of all to weaken and destroy Arab-Soviet friendship, because this friendship is to be considered an important element helping the Arab countries to solve their domestic problems and their internal domestic and foreign political problems together. In conclusion, I can state that the real national forces in the progressive Arab countries, and in the forefront in Syria, highly value the import of the treaty of friendship and cooperation between the Soviet Union and Syria and consider it of use and benefit to thw whole Arab nation.

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CUBA'S POST-REVOLUTION ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT MODEL

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 1, Jan 81 signed to press 2 Dec 80
pp 17-31

/Article by V. I. Bondarchuk: "Formation of the System of Production Management in Cuba (1959--1963)"/

/Text/ In its most general aspect the problem of management may be pictured as the process of acting upon a given system for the purpose of maintaining it within a given regime or converting it to a new status, based upon the utilization of objective laws which are inherent to it.

The present article proposes to examine the basepoint of departure as well as the initial process of creating a management system in Cuba at the time of the development and transition of the Revolution to the path of socialist transformations and, at the same time, to ascertain those characteristics which served as a basis for subsequent changes in the course of forming a system of economic management which was already directly at the stage of building socialism.

In a number of works[1] we have already considered certain specific traits of the economy of the transition period of the Cuban Revolution, in particular, those which had the greatest influence on the pace of development and the scope of the state sector in industry and agriculture, on the distinguishing traits of its formation in comparison with other countries of the socialist community. In our opinion, these characteristics comprise the following points.

First, Cuba's economy was created under the conditions of a developing dependent capitalism, which was expressed in the presence of a considerable amount (proportionately) of foreign property in the form of branches and daughter enterprises of parent companies which were located outside of Cuba.

Here we should particularly emphasize the fact that various national links in the management of large-scale enterprises and even sectors (electric-power production, communications, the nickel industry, etc.) occupied merely a subordinate position in the aggregate organizational structure of the "periphery--center" management system.

Second, the concentration of the country's industrial production was characterized by sectors based on processing imported raw materials, and in connection with this a number of industrial enterprises (oil-refining, chemical, textile, flour-milling, and even machine-building) were situated in strictly localized zones of the country,

for the most part, in cities having seaports to receive equipment and raw materials.[2]

Third, the high marketability of the production structure was notable not only in the large-scale capitalist enterprises but also among the small-scale producers with, at the same time, a considerable proportion of export production in a number of sectors (sugar, tobacco).

Moreover, the organizational structure and mechanism of the international capitalist market played the role of a connecting system, regulating the conditions and volumes not only of production but also of the sales of the end-product (for example, raw sugar, tobacco, fruit, vegetables, nickel-cobalt concentrates, etc.).

Fourth, Cuba had at its disposal quite a well-developed infrastructure. Most of the industrial and even the agricultural enterprises were serviced by an extremely well-branched system of transportation: railroads and roads, as well as telegraph and radio communication. The communications which had been set up among the management centers and the production subdivisions ensured a high level of data collection and processing, controls and accounting in practically all the units of material production throughout the country.

The characteristics indicated above constituted the basis of the fact that under the conditions of the market mechanism of economic activity (inherent in the capitalist system) and by virtue of the dependent nature of the economy, the leading sectors of the country's economy were being managed directly or indirectly (through the system of foreign market connections) from the headquarters staffs of foreign monopolies or their branches located in Havana.

All this could not fail but lead to a number of specific traits in the initial stage of carrying out socialist changes, including also the formation of a general state system for managing production.

In studying the evolution of the management system, it has been necessary to take into account the general purposes and problems which were resolved at various phases and stages of development of the Cuban Revolution of this period,[3] inasmuch as it is precisely in such an interrelationship that we can elucidate most fully and correctly the problems under consideration.

During the first phase of the Cuban Revolution's development (prior to July 1959) the country's economy and, consequently, the system of managing its economic activity did not undergo any substantial changes, and it basically preserved the structure, principles, and methods of the pre-Revolutionary period.

Nevertheless, we must take note that already at this time there were emerging individual organizational management systems possessing traits and characteristics which were appropriate to the popular-democratic and socialist phases. Among them we should include the administration of technical, material, and cultural aid to the peasantry, which was created among others under the Ministry of National Defense, and which was called upon "to apply revolutionary efforts to transform the Rebel Army into the most effective moving force of the consolidating phase of the Revolution."[4]

The country was divided into four regions, headed up by representatives of the above-mentioned administration. Each region in turn was subdivided into zones the managers of which were directly subordinate to the representative in charge of the entire region. Thus, as early as February 1959, i.e., while still under the conditions of the practically undivided domination of the capitalist system of the economy the basis was laid throughout the country for a management structure which would answer the purposes and interests of the revolutionary forces, as represented by the Movement of 26 July and the Rebel Army.

It should be emphasized that the regional and zonal organs, in addition to regulating economic activity, in accordance with the law were called upon to implement and coordinate other trends of social life in the localities as well--in the fields of education, health care, culture, propagandizing the goals and tasks of the Revolution, etc., and in fact they were transformed into a unique prototype of genuine revolutionary organs of power in the localities. Moreover, they were given the right to take control over all types of property which had been transformed into state property, to manage it and guard it.[5]

By a decision of the Council of Ministers considerable funds were provided for disposal by this administration and the territorial organs subordinate to it for the construction, primarily in rural areas, of housing, schools, warehouses, people's stores, and modest-size enterprises for processing agricultural output, restoring forests, etc.

It was precisely on the basis of this initial organizational structure of management in accordance with the Agrarian Reform Law of 17 May 1959[6] that the management system was created, known as the National Agrarian Reform Institute (INRA), in the form of 26 zones of agrarian development and five provincial administrations, subordinate to the national leadership.

The need to create INRA was dictated by the fact that "at the same time that the Agrarian Reform Law was proclaimed, a mechanism was required for its implementation, a mechanism which would be free of the bureaucratic manifestations which are inherent in all state organs which the Revolution has inherited from the old system. Therefore, this Institute was formed; by possessing autonomy (leadership--V.B.), it had the duty from the very beginning of introducing a new revolutionary style and of acting dynamically within the broad possibilities for creating a management structure and flexibly applying the above-indicated law."[7]

The events of July 1959 led to a qualitative shift in the arrangement of the class forces and the development of the Cuban Revolution.[8] The Revolution entered upon the popular-democratic phase, which was immediately reflected in the pace and scope of the nationalization and expropriation of capitalist property, and it led to an expansion of state ownership of the means of production. The new tasks and duties of the Revolutionary government with regard to managing the rapidly growing state sector required the creation within the body of INRA and its territorial organs of special subdivisions for managing agricultural production, sugar mills, and other industrial enterprises, forestry, fishing, etc.[9]

This last-named circumstance was dictated by the need to pose and solve problems which the Revolutionary regime had set in motion, and sometimes even despite the

actions of the governmental apparatus which was still in office; in a number of cases these governmental organs were still headed up by members of the national bourgeoisie.[10] Because of this, INRA, which was directed by Fidel Castro personally, constituted a de facto independent government organ, which parallel with managing the emergent state sector of the economy in mutual cooperation with the Rebel Army (mainly in the initial stage) carried out the transformation of the country's entire socioeconomic system.

In the middle of 1959 (by the time of the proclamation of the Agrarian Reform Laws and the initial stage of replacing the bourgeois elements in the government by representatives of the Revolutionary Movement) the organizational management structure for material production was represented by ministries subordinate to the Council of Ministers--Agriculture, Recuperation of Illegally Acquired Funds, Finance, Labor, Public Works, Trade, Communications, and National Transport.

In the group listed above there is no ministry nor department for managing industry. At the same time within the INRA structure, and based upon the economic subdivisions which had been transferred from the Rebel Army in September 1959, there was created a Main Administration of State Sugar Mills and Sugarcane Plantations[11] and an Administration for Industrialization, which was headed up by Ernesto Che Guevara.[12]

The reason for creating this structural subdivision was the fact that, although INRA "came into being as an agricultural organism to manage all production in this sector, nonetheless, there appeared the need to add something new to it. This new thing was the Administration for Industrialization, which at first constituted an institution whose activity was limited to the industrialization of agricultural production."[13]

As the state sector of the economy grew, there arose the need to expand INRA's sphere of activity and accordingly that of its Administration for Industrialization. "We soon saw that even more important than the industrialization of agriculture and livestock-raising was the delineation of the problems which Cuba had to solve and the possibilities for carrying them out. At that time we created a subdivision to study the principal directions of the development of the basic sectors with the exclusive or almost exclusive participation of the state, proceeding from the idea of transferring these sectors to the disposition of the entire nation."[14]

Among such sectors Che Guevara named fuel and energy, ferrous metallurgy, machine building, sugar, chemicals, mining, and the processing of agricultural products. He provided the grounds for the need of their subordination to the state by the fact that in such a case "the state will control all economic policy." Moreover, in other "secondary sectors... those which are less important than the ones indicated above, the state and private owners would be able to cooperate, and only at a still lower level,(i.e., in tertiary sectors--B.V.) private entrepreneurs could take part individually in the country's industrialization."[15]

These utterances contain extremely interesting and important positions, disclosing the policy of the Revolutionary government not only in the sphere of management in the popular-democratic phase of the Revolution's development but also the economic

policy of developing the state and private sectors in the sphere of industrial production. At that time the question had not yet been posed of liquidating the middle-class and petty industrial bourgeoisie (who occupied the dominant position in the "secondary" and "tertiary" sectors), and the possibility was even recognized of its participation jointly with the state in the development of these sectors. Advanced as the chief task was the need to transfer tostate management the leading sectors of Cuba's national economy.

Thus, along with reinforcing the dominant position of the state-run industrial sector in the key, decisive branches of the economy, conditions were guaranteed for the existance of private enterprise, which was supposed to cooperate harmoniously on the jointly subordinated "secondary" and "tertiary" levels.

The exacerbation of the class struggle during the second half of 1959--1960 and the gradual development of the Cuban Revolution were accompanied by profound sociopolitical and economic changes. The dominance of public ownership of the means of production in practically all sectors of Cuba's national economy at the end of 1960 led to a situation whereby the spontaneous regulators of material production which are inherent to the capitalist structure (market relations, competition, etc.) ceased to have any effect on the Cuban economy, and there was a sharp increase in the state's role in managing the economy.

At the same time, because of the economy's considerable dependence on the foreign market and under the conditions of the economic blockade and the radical transformations in the social structure, there arose the need to concentrate all material resources, as well as their distribution, within an integrated system of state-run management. Moving to the fore on the agenda was the task of forming a system of state and non-state institutions and organizations, headed by the revolutionary government and the Integrated Revolutionary Organizations (the prototype of the future Communist Party of Cuba).

The reasons indicated above brought about the creation at the beginning of 1961 of a number of new functional and sectorial ministries and departments, such as the Central Planning Commission, the Ministry of Domestic Trade, the Ministry of Foreign Trade, the Ministry of Industry,[16] the Ministry of Construction, etc.

In remarking upon the role to be played by these institutions, O. Dorticós pointed out that "the creation of the new state organs has essentially changed the composition and functions of the state. The new Cuban state is the organization of the political power of the working classes, who are the owners of the basic means of production in our country."[17]

It was precisely during the years 1959--1961, in the process of creating the primary model of the general state system for managing the economy, that its individual elements emerged and were developed; it was then that differences were manifested in the methods and mechanisms for directing the sectors and enterprises; these later became the basis for seeking out the most acceptable system for managing production under the conditions of the transition to building the material-technical base of a socialist system.

In considering the phase of the emergence of a management system as a component part of the transition period of socioeconomic changes and of building socialism

as a whole, it is incorrect to say that the cessation of the influence of market relations occurs automatically (by virtue of the socialization of the basic means of production) and is automatically accompanied by a transition to a planned organizational management, based on the practical application of objective laws, inherent to the appropriate phase of the socialist system.

Moreover, as the practical experience of socialist countries has shown, during the transition period the authoritarian power, the use of administrative methods in managing the emerging social sector of the national economy for a number of reasons are very powerful and partially for a time substitute for (but do not replace) principles, methods, and organizational structure, based on the requirements of the objective economic laws of socialism. Of course, in this case one must proceed from an objective evaluation of the conditions determining the time period of the transition from an authoritative (administrative) influence on and regulation of economic activity to a system of economic management.

The increase in the volume of social production under the conditions of maintaining the private capitalist system of financing and material-technical supply, while retaining a dependence on the foreign capitalist market, moved up the task of rapidly selecting a system for managing social production, which, naturally, could not be the same type for all the branches and sub-branches of the state sector, taking into account the conditions set forth above.[18]

The high degree of concentration of the basic means of production in the hands of foreign and national capital led to a situation whereby the revolutionary regime during the course of nationalization and expropriation had transferred to it whole production complexes or parts of them with a structure and management methods organically inherent to capitalism. For the most part, this was in the field of industry, transport, communications, and agriculture. These reasons also conditioned the organizational structure of Cuba's Ministry of Industry, formed on the basis of the INRA[19] Administration of Industrialization, consisting of the sectorial production associations,[20] the industrial enterprises subordinate to them, grouped together by the same type of output or based on a unified technical production process, as well as subdivisions of material-technical supply and marketing. It should be pointed out that these sectorial production associations were nothing else but nationalized foreign companies, firms, or branches with the appropriate replacement of the management personnel or even with its retention, but under the strict control of the revolutionary regime.

It could be said that in the given phase the directorial unit of the management system of the former firms and their branches was, so to speak, "cut off," liquidated, and replaced by the power of the victorious people. This allowed the nationalized sectors, sub-branches, and individual enterprises to be managed without having recourse to breaking up the structure of the middle- and lower-level units, as well as the mechanism and management methods inherent to them prior to nationalization and expropriation.

The following may serve as characteristic examples of this: Empresa Consolidada de Electricidad, which was nothing other than the former Cuban Electric Company, which belonged, despite its name, to American capital; also production associations for mining nickel (with plants in Niquero and Moa), for making varnishes and paints, refining petroleum, etc.

Production associations analogous in structure were formed in other sectors which prior to the Revolution did not have such a high level of organizational management structure. To this group can also be relegated the Main Administration of Sugar Mills, production associations of the flour-milling, baking, alcoholic-beverage industry, and others which were created by the Revolution.

The complete nationalization of the basic means of industrial production from all categories of the Cuban bourgeoisie at the end of 1962 led to the appearance in the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Industry of a considerable number of diverse medium- and small-scale enterprises, which were partly included in the mix of the national production associations, while most of them were transferred to the jurisdiction of the Ministry's territorial organs.

In 1963 the organizational structure of the Ministry of Industry, which combined 76 percent of the industrial production of the country's state sector, represented the following three-unit system of management.[21]

Each sectorial production association included from 4 to 74 enterprises (with an average of 19 enterprises), situated throughout the entire country.

Characteristic of industry at this stage were management methods based on the "self-financing of production associations," which later became widespread in the Ministry of Industry as a whole.

During the early days "self-financing of production associations" was a result of the need to ensure the normal production process, while drawing as little as possible upon the financial means of the private capitalist banks, which were still being retained in those first few years.

The essence of this system, which was reinforced by a legislative procedure in January 1962, boiled down to the fact that all the enterprises in the state sector were freed from taxes, and their earnings, defined as the difference between revenues and outlays, went into the state budget. Accounting operations, connected with commodity-monetary circulation and the control over financial operations based on an integrated system of noncash /clearing/ transactions in the state sector, were carried out by the National Bank of Cuba[22] by means of registering payment documents and drawing up the financial plans of enterprises with contracts for the production of output and the obtaining of raw materials, as well as with the wage-payment funds and those for capital investments, as approved in a centralized procedure.

Using present-day terminology, the above-mentioned method of management could be characterized as the method of "direct economic accounting," based on applying the

specific economic laws of socialism, "when the cost /value/ categories are utilized merely as accounting instruments, and mandatory assignments proceed from the center and are realized through the plan."[23]

We must emphasize that the application of this method in the Ministry of Industry during the period indicated was aimed at achieving effectiveness in social production, and in no case whatsoever did it abolish or infringe upon the independence of the production associations or even that of the large-scale enterprises, nor did it exclude the use in a necessary combination of the principles of material and moral incentives. We would like to dwell especially on this fact, inasmuch as at times it comes into conflict with the assertions that Che Guevara was opposed to the decentralization of management, the use of material incentives, etc.

The present article does not propose to examine the theoretical aspects of the discussion which began in Cuba at that time with regard to questions of management methods; hence we consider it possible to limit ourselves solely to an exposition of the individual causes which explain to a certain extent, in our opinion, the emergence of various points of view on the formation of the two basic management methods in the state sector of the Cuban economy--cost accounting and direct economic accounting.

First of all, it should be pointed out that Che Guevara in his approach to creating a system for managing material production proceeded from the position that "the Cuban Revolution, having rapidly left behind its initial character of an anti-imperialist, democratic revolution, has been transformed into a socialist revolution, and, therefore, all the problems which arise should be studied from the point of view of a state which is marching toward socialism, and in the light of the great guiding principles of Marxism, taking into consideration the experience of countries which are effectively building socialism...."[24]

The system of centralized management which was adopted at that time provided for the possibility of decentralizing the decision-making process. "This general task (managing industry--V.B.) is based on the idea of a centralized direction of the economy, but we must understand the following clearly: a centralized management does not necessarily mean that all decisions are to be taken at the highest level."[25]

The limited nature of using material incentives, in our opinion, may be explained, in particular, by the fact that the victorious Revolution among the diverse socioeconomic problems inherited from the previous regime one of the most serious defects of capitalism--unemployment. In 1958, even according to the data of bourgeois statistics, Cuba had from 300,000 to 500,000 completely unemployed persons, or from 15 to 25 percent of the country's total workforce. Despite the energetic measures of the Revolutionary government and the emigration of a portion of the employable population during the first few years of the Revolution, at the beginning of 1962 the country still had 214,700 unemployed.[26]

The above-mentioned circumstance is confirmed by the following statement made by Che Guevara: "We have also striven to provide modest-sized material incentives, insignificant as compared with the efforts of the people, but these are what the

government can provide and is providing at this time. Because every material incentive is a small amount of the funds which is torn away from the total product to make an individual reward for a worker; this means the impossibility of creating an additional work slot, and our principal task in this first phase is to finally and completely liquidate unemployment in Cuba."[27]

The management system in the state sector of agriculture took shape in a somewhat different manner, utilizing distinctive organizational forms and methods. This situation is explained by the fact that in agriculture land is not only the object but also the basic means of production, directly dependent on conditions of nature and climate, and this on the whole predetermines a specialization and territorial dispersal, as well as requiring the decentralization of many management functions. Moreover, taking into consideration the interrelatedness and interdependence of socioeconomic factors (the labor force and the system of the production infrastructure) in agriculture, we must devote attention to those characteristics which manifest themselves under the conditions of the presence of communal and private or individual forms of production.

For these reasons in creating formally diverse state farms in Cuba during the years 1960--1961 the methods of management which had formerly been utilized to one degree or another were retained--the piecework system of labor payment, the decentralization of economic decisions, forms of financing, material and technical supply, etc.

As we have already stated above, the first organs for managing the public sector of production were created at the end of 1960. As the state fund of lands increased and agricultural enterprises were formed (in the form of people's estates, sugarcane cooperatives, and administrative estates[28]), main administration for each of the above-mentioned types of farms were formed within INRA. In 1962, after the unification of these three types of state farms, an integrated main administration of people's estates (state farms) was organized. At the same time as the implementation of the culminating phase of the Agrarian Reform (the Second Agrarian Reform Law of 3 October 1963) work was carried out on creating an integrated organizational structure for managing the state sector of agriculture according to the following scheme: INRA--provincial administration--territorial-production association--people's estate. It must be emphasized that at all the above-mentioned stages of development the system for managing the state sector of agriculture constituted a territorial-production structure, i.e., it combined within itself a centralized management with consideration being given to local initiative and the requirements of the territorial organs of power.

We must not fail to note the fact that under this management method distinctions were made between the strict centralization of the decisions which were adopted and the controls over their execution, as well as the regulation of the material and technical supply and the financing of all types of economic activity.

This is confirmed by the fact that prior to the reorganization mentioned above all revenues received by the production associations or the main administrations, amortized deductions, as well as various state subsidies from the state budget were transferred to the central account of INRA, from which financial losses were

paid off, capital investments were paid out, as well as the current and other outlays of all the farms without exception, including the expenditures of the central apparatus as well. Only certain individual production associations of INRA--those raising tobacco, coffee, and cacao--obtained banking credits as additional sums, basically as payments for procurements of the agricultural produce.

Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that along with improving the organizational structure of INRA during these years individual elements of cost accounting were worked out and introduced. We are speaking here of the development and introduction of the system of commodity-monetary relations between the people's estates and the enterprises in other sectors of the national economy, as well as accounts with financial organizations, norms of labor and wages, determination of the costs of output produced, and the procedure for providing material and moral incentives for workers.

It would be incorrect, however, to assert that in the initial period of the state sector of Cuba's agriculture's existence its organizational structure, methods, and management mechanism were already based on cost accounting. It is more correct to define the system of managing agriculture which was in effect during the years 1959--1963 as a strictly centralized one, based on budgetary financing, but at the same time with elements of cost accounting and decentralization, i.e., with the incipience of forms and methods appropriate for economical management methods.

As is well known, on the eve of the Revolution the Cuban economy had a high level of specialization within the framework of the international division of labor and, accordingly, a high degree of dependence on the foreign market. As a result, in 1958 the volume of foreign trade amounted to 58.7 percent of the volume of the Gross National Product (exports--28.5 percent and imports--30.2 percent).[29] The presence of an extremely "rigid" tie between the volumes of Cuba's commodity turnover and material production is also testified to by the fact that the proportion of imports in the total amount of the production consumption of raw materials, etc. in a number of leading sectors was extremely high, for example, in the oil-refinery industry--79 percent, metallurgical--44 percent, mining--40 percent, chemical--58 percent, textile--22 percent, and even in construction--more than 12 percent.[30] In connection with such a structure of the Cuban economy, its foreign-trade component frequently had a top-priority, decisive importance in ensuring the conditions for the most effective economic activity. Naturally, prior to the Revolution the state's participation in foreign-trade activity on the part of capitalist firms (whether national or even more so, foreign) was limited to purely fiscal measures (taxes, customs tariffs, and the like).

But during the first few months after the victory of the Revolution the government adopted a number of laws and measures aimed at limiting and even abolishing the preferences and privileges which had been granted to capitalist firms during the pre-Revolutionary period; such preferences and privileges had provided an opportunity for a de facto plundering of the national wealth by means of the mechanism of foreign trade. The formation of the state sector in industry and agriculture allowed the creation as early as July 1959 within the body of INRA of a special administration of production and foreign trade. It was precisely this subdivision

which constituted the basis for the simultaneous establishment of a state monopoly on foreign trade and the formation in April 1961 of the Ministry of Foreign Trade, encompassing the following three administrations--imports, exports, and services.

The creation of this ministry coincided in time with the tensest period in the life of the country. The re-orientation of Cuba's foreign economic ties occurred under the conditions of an economic blockade and internal radical socioeconomic changes. The rapid expansion of the functions of the Ministry of Foreign Trade, brought about by the need to guarantee not only the export and import of commodities but also other types of foreign economic activity (the acquisition of projects, technology, complete enterprises, and the enlistment of foreign specialists), was accompanied by the constant development of the structure of the central apparatus and the creation of a number of new subdivisions within it. By the beginning of 1964 there were 18 export-import associations within the Ministry, and main administrations were also created for trade policy, prices, and information.

The establishment of a monopoly on foreign trade and the creation of the Ministry allowed the government to weaken to a considerable degree the negative influence of the economic blockade and within a brief period of time to re-orient foreign economic ties to the markets of the countries of the socialist community; this was one of the most important conditions ensuring the subsequent development of the Cuban Revolution along the path of building socialism.

The brief analysis which we have conducted on the emergence and development of a system for managing the public sector of material production has shown that during the years 1959--1963 in Cuba there was created and put into operation a system of strict centralization of all types of economic and financial activity with the application in most cases of administrative management methods.

Nevertheless, despite the difficulties which characterized the transitional period, along with the abrupt complication of foreign economic and internal political conditions, the intensification of the class struggle, the lack of experience and of trained personnel, the given system, with all its shortcomings, did allow at that time the Revolutionary authorities in Cuba to successfully solve the main tasks of managing the country's national economy and, at the same time, to ensure a base-point of departure for creating and making the transition to more efficient and, of course, more complex systems and methods, appropriate for the socialist stage of an economy's development.

In our opinion, any other system could have retarded the process of expanding and consolidating the state sector of the Cuban economy. This conclusion is based upon the fact that during the period under consideration of the Cuban Revolution's development all the socioeconomic changes in industry, agriculture, and other spheres of the economy were being carried out along with the adoption of measures for the immediate defense of the Revolution from a rapidly mounting wave of economic, political, and military aggression, and they inevitably had to be carried out on the basis of an integrated policy from a unified center of administration.

The need for such consistency in solving problems was emphasized in his own times by V. I. Lenin, when he pointed out that it was necessary "at first to actually implement the simplest matter, to organize what was at hand extremely well,--and then to prepare for something more complex."[31]

As is well known, at the end of the phase in the Cuban economy under consideration here an extremely tense situation took shape, which can be explained to a considerable extent by the economic blockade, the increase in expenditures on defense, and by naturaldisasters--droughts and hurricanes. To a certain extent, however, the difficulties of economic development were also caused by the lack of plans, by their insufficient grounding, defects in the management structure, manifestations of bureaucratism, and other negative elements.

The culmination by the end of 1963 of the nationalization and expropriation of most of the basic means of production /fixed capital/, along with the consolidation of the central and local organs of power, manifested the need to restructure the management of the country's economy, the use of more effective methods of management, i.e., the creation of a management system adequate for the phase of building socialism. However, these questions require special examination.

FOOTNOTES

1. In particular see: LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, No 6, 1978, pp 46-50; "Kuba: opyt obshchestvennogo razvitiya" /Cuba: An Experiment in Social Development/, Moscow, 1979.

2. Ye. D. Volkova et al., "Respublika Kuba" /The Republic of Cuba/, Moscow, 1979, pp 118-157.

3. In defining the phases and stages of the Cuban Revolution's development, the author has basically used his own suggested scheme of periodization. See: LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, No 6, 1978, pp 44-47.

4. "Leyes agrarias revolucionarias," Havana, 1960, p 20.

5. We are speaking here about property (industrial, agricultural, recreational, etc.), belonging to the overthrown dictator Batista and the persons around him; this property was expropriated in accordance with one of the first laws of the Revolutionary government.

6. "Leyes agrarias revolucionarias," pp 58-169, 171, 204, 205, 218, 242.

7. CUBA SOCIALISTA, No 1, 1961, p 29.

8. In July 1959, under pressure from the masses, the bourgeois part of the government and President Urrutia were compelled to leave office. Entering the government at that time were the leaders of the Revolution and the Rebel Army. For more details see: LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, No 6, 1978.

9. "Leyes agrarias revolucionarias," pp 207, 212.

10. During the course of the Revolution's subsequent development some of them went over to the side of the Counter-Revolution and later even headed up various anti-Cuban organizations abroad.

11. "Leyes agrarias revolucionarias," p 268.

12. Ibid, pp 295-297.

13. "El Che en la Revolución Cubana," Vol 1, Havana, 1967, p 90.

14. Ibid, p 91.

15. Ibid.

16. The title "Ministry of Industry" ("industriya" instead of "promyshlennost'"), in our opinion, reflects more precisely the mix of branches included within it: metallurgy, machine building, mining, electric-power engineering, and chemicals.

17. CUBA SOCIALISTA, No 1, 1961, p 30.

18. Taking into consideration the fact that at that time INRA and the Ministry of Industry combined in their mix enterprises with a total amount in the state sector of Cuba of approximately 94 percent of the industrial and 100 percent of the agricultural production and had under their jurisdiction a high proportion in the sectors of fishing, transport, communications, construction, etc., we deem it possible not to examine in the present article the composition, structure, and management methods of other departments.

19. Until May 1965 INRA retained the management of the food and mixed-feed industries, as well as individual machine-building enterprises.

20. The term "empresa consolidada" has led to confusion among Soviet researchers, and it has various interpretations. We propose a Russian analogy--the sectorial production association, which, in our opinion, at least structurally as well as methodologically, corresponds to the units which now exist for managing industrial production in the USSR.

21. CUBA SOCIALISTA, No 57, 1965, pp 101-105.

22. Except for individual associations included within the mix of INRA and the Ministry of Foreign Trade, in which beginning in 1962, elements of the cost-accounting system were worked out and introduced.

23. "Upravleniye sotsialisticheskim proizvodstvom. Voprosy teorii i praktiki" [The Management of Socialist Production: Questions of Theory and Practice], Moscow, 1974, p 230.

24. "El Che en la Revolución Cubana," Vol 1, p 96.

25. Ibid, p 163.

26. NOTICIAS DE HOY, Havana, 27 Jan 1962.

27. "El Che en la Revolución Cubana," Vol 3, p 108.

28. For more details see "Kuba: opyt obshchestvennogo razvitiya," Moscow, 1962, pp 108-112.

29. CUBA SOCIALISTA, No 28, 1963, p 2; "Estudio económico de América Latina," New York, 1963, pp 280, 286.

30. CUBA SOCIALISTA, No 28, 1963, p 3.

31. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." /Complete Collected Works/, Vol 36, pp 182-183.

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WESTERN ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE DESCRIBED BY COMMENTATOR

Tbilisi KOMUNISTI in Georgian 14 Jan 81 p 2

[Article by M. Radiani under rubric "Free World Indeed": "Electronic Piracy"]

> [Text] American armed forces headquarters in Western Europe announced that four aircraft arrived from America in the FRG, equipped with long-distance radar detection systems. By 1985 there will be 18 of them in West Germany.
>
> The Western press says that the purpose of these "spies in the sky" is to "keep an eye on" the socialist countries.

Since World War II, the United States and its allies have created a large-scale, powerful electronic espionage network, the main purpose of which is the gathering, analysis, and processing of military, diplomatic, civil, and commercial information from the communications channels of other countries.

In the past 10 years, the main objects of this surveillance have been the countries of the Near ar Middle East, due to the political and economic importance of these regions.

The organization which runs these surveillance stations is part of the United States National Security Agency, whose yearly budget is 12 billion dollars. The agency's activities are not confined to getting hold of diplomatic and military information. It is also interested in gathering and processing information from the communications channels of second-class and Third World countries, America's allies in the NATO bloc and the countries of the Near East.

The information that is gathered is turned over to the Pentagon, the State Department, and other state institutions and corporations.

American and British listening posts have been monitoring the Near East since the 1940s. For many years the biggest stations were in Kegniu (near Asmara, in Ethiopia) and Peshawar (northeast Pakistan). The "working sphere" of the gigant'c Kegniu station, under American management, was Egypt, the Arabian peninsula, the Persian Gulf, and a number of regions in northeast Africa. Former agents of the CIA report that in order to help along the work of the secret Kegniu station officials of the Department of Defense in 1970 "gave false information about the existing situation" to members of a United States congressional investigation committee, and gave 100 million dollars in military aid to the Haile Selassie regime. The Kegniu station ceased to exist in the 1970s.

A number of British listening posts on Cyprus were also working on gathering information in the Near East, "keeping an ear" on Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq. Two listening posts near Famagusta were manned by British Army and Royal Air Force personnel. One former military serviceman stated that these stations were especially interested in the oil companies, whose communications were carefully monitored.

Even more detailed information is available about a second secret installation, USV-23, which was located in Morocco's Bidi-Yahai Desert and was officially designated as a "training center" for King Hassan's army. But not a single Moroccan ever set foot on it. The "training center's" main mission was to get hold of information from Near Eastern and northern and central African communications lines.

At the time of the closing of the American base in Morocco in 1978, private corporations were invited into the country to set up an internal monitoring system. Some 200 million dollars were allocated for the project. But the corporation's other mission was to gather information about the Polisario Front and dissident groups. According to American newspapers, Northrop and Page, the firms manufacturing the installations and equipment, gave the project the code name "West Wind Program."

The same purposes were served by the widely acclaimed Ibex station, which American companies began to build in Iran before the revolution. This station was also to be the biggest installation in the Near East for listening on telephone conversations.

The listening post was only able to carry out part of its mission in early 1979, before the Iranian revolution.

The Americans have sent their latest monitoring systems to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Israel, and, most recently, Egypt.

At present, British and American listening posts most concerned with the Near East are located in Heraklion (Crete), Brindisi (Italy), Sinop and other cities in Turkey, Diego Garcia (in the Indian Ocean), and elsewhere. Small scale listening posts are installed in embassies and foreign consulates.

Since the closing down of a number of "rationally deployed" listening posts, however, the Americans' and Britons' tasks have become harder.

According to the British journal NEW STATESMAN, all telephone conversations in Britain can be "picked up" by the secret American National Security Agency's base in (Mendwit-Hill) in Yorkshire. Some specialists conjecture that relatively smaller telephone monitoring centers are located in West Germany and Italy, the main task of which is to process information from Near Eastern communications channels.

But the most "exotic" listening posts are those deployed 23,000 miles out in space. They are equipped with spiderweb antennas capable of picking up the faintest signal on earth.

A whole series of such American satellites have been launched, and given names such as (Riolet), Argus, Aquaman, and Chalet. Their function is to provide early warning. When necessary, these "serene" guardians have the ability to pick up any kind of information and then transmit it to centers in Australia, California, Diego Garcia, and Britain. There the newly received information is classified by computer to pick out "essential" telephone conversations and determine "friendly" individuals.

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INTERNATIONAL

BRAZIL REPORTAGE FOCUSES ON COMMUNISTS

Tbilisi KOMUNISTI in Georgian 28 Dec 80 p 3

[Conclusion of two-part article by Pilipe Makharadze under rubric "Countries and Impressions": "Under Brazilian Skies. From a Journalist's Notebook"]

[Text] The idea of moving Brazil's capital city to the interior was put forth by Brazilian statesmen as early as the beginning of the 19th century. The 1891 constitution stipulated that construction of a new capital was to begin on the central plateau. On 7 September 1922--the 100th anniversary of Brazilian independence, the first, symbolic foundation stone for a future capital city on the central plateau was laid. The date for the official opening of the new capital was set for 21 April 1960, and indeed, thanks to tens of thousands of workers the official ceremony marking the opening of the new capital city took place on that day.

Rio de Janeiro, the former capital, became the administrative center of the state of the same name.

We members of USSR group for friendship and cultural relations with foreign countries were received by the chairman of the Brazil-USSR Friendship and Cultural Relations Society.

He was a medium-tall, thin, simply dressed man with sad eyes and a shy smile, a man who is considered to be one of today's greatest architects. He is Oscar Niemeyer, and it was he who designed the city of Brasilia. He cannot get used to his fame, his almost legendary name. Many books have been written about him in the United States, France, Switzerland, and Japan. The authors of these books and articles attempt to fathom the secret of his creativity, his genius.

But there is no secret. Niemeyer simply loves life, people. "I believe that Brasilia is to become a city of happy people who live life to the fullest," he wrote concerning the fruit of his creativity, the beautiful capital of Brazil. He has built hundreds of fine residential buildings, schools, hospitals, theaters, and stadiums, but he knows very well that this is not enough for man's happiness. What is needed, he says, is to "build" new relations among men. It was for this reason that he became a communist, and he has been awarded the international Lenin Prize "For Strengthening Peace Among Peoples."

Members of the delegation presented gifts to their host. I gave him a silver-studded drinking horn full of Kakhetian wine and a white Svanian hat. He was very excited and presented me with a book which he inscribed. At the meeting there was fond praise in recalling the unparalleled triumph of the Georgian Folk Dance Ensemble.

The Communist Party, which is the experienced vanguard of Brazil's working class, has been and remains the only well-organized party in that country, although it is forced to operate deep underground. Soviet readers are well acquainted with Lenin Prize Laureate Jorge Amado's works. His novels have been published in many countries of the world. In his novel "Freedom's Underground," the great Brazilian writer portrays his heroes in times of struggle and peaceful labor, in the warmth of the family, and in prison dungeons, where brutal interrogators try in vain to break their iron will. But no matter where these people are, they are striving for their people's freedom, and they express fervent love for that bulwark of peace and their own dear party--the Soviet Union.

The author has presented these feelings very well in one episode of the novel, where Marina Azavedo, a staunch communist and perceptive human being, is thinking about the party: "Her party--the party for which her own father gave his life, for the sake of which so many men give up home and family and put themselves in danger, giving up the right to walk freely through the streets during daylight! How she loved the party, persecuted and unafraid, standing vigil before the dawn of mankind's bright future. Great pride warms the heart of this simple, unassuming girl when she thinks of her party.

"To what can be compared this party, which consists of people who live for the sake of others, no man knows where; people who do not sleep at night and whose bodies still bear the marks of police torture? The party reminds her of the sea, the boundless blue sea....Her party is like the sea, as boundless as the ocean. It covers the vastness of the earth. It has triumphed in the Soviet Union, it is fighting in Spain. Fierce battle is raging in other countries as well. It is an underground sea, which one fine day will burst through the surface in gigantic waves to wash depravity and injustice from the face of the earth."

Eighty years ago the well-known Brazilian public figure Rio Branco visited an international fair held in St Petersburg. Trade with Russia holds great promise, he wrote. And he advocated establishing regular trade with Russia. Today, the volume of mutually beneficial trade is much greater than then. Sales of Brazilian coffee, cacao, cotton, leather, tobacco, and fruit are widespread in our country. For her part, Brazil needs Soviet oil, which helps the country's economic development. Brazil also buys other goods from us. No one is surprised any more to see Soviet ships in Brazil's harbors. Books by Brazilian authors are published in our country. We are familiar with Brazilian films and national ensembles. It is impossible to watch their fiery dances and not be enchanted by their soul-stirring songs. For her part, Brazil is acquainted with Soviet exhibits and has seen Soviet films and paintings by our artists. Thus, the peoples of two great countries are coming to know one another better.

The country's forces of reaction are utilizing every possible means, sparing no effort or money, to distort the truth about the Soviet Union and discredit the ideas

of communism. But their strivings are in vain! No one will ever be able to hide the sun with the palm of a hand!

In Brazil, as in many countries of the world, the people always have a warm welcome for representatives of the Land of the Soviets. Just such an event was the recent visit, at the invitation of the Chamber of Deputies of the Brazilian National Congress, of a USSR Supreme Soviet delegation headed by CPSU CC Politburo Candidate Member and USSR Supreme Soviet deputy Comrade E. A. Shevardnadze.

We met many who recalled with fond hope the Soviet parliamentarian delegation's highly useful visit to Brazil and who firmly believe that contacts between the USSR and Brazil will grow increasingly stronger and deeper. Clear confirmation of this is the very recent tour of a delegation of the Chamber of Deputies of the National Congress of the Federative Republic of Brazil in our country.

There are many beautiful trees in Brasilia. One such is a pau-ferro (ironwood) which bears a plaque with the inscription: "This tree was planted by the head of the USSR Supreme Soviet delegation, CPSU CC Politburo Candidate Member E. Shevardnadze, 13 April 1980." The tree is being well cared for. It is thriving and putting down deep roots.

We say farewell to this country, which is as beautiful as the sky and a dream.

Farewell to this country, which resembles our own Georgia in so many ways.

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BRIEFS

MOSCOW COMMENTS ON EL SALVADOR--Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 14 January 1981 publishes on page 3, under the headline "El Salvador: Soldiers Had Rifles and Death Lists..." the 1,000-word first part of a 2-part article by Yu. Stroyev on the situation in El Salvador. The author begins by describing U.S. influence in Latin America as a whole and then specifically in El Salvador through the dictatorships of Martinez and Romero to the present junta seeing it aiming constantly at suppressing the national liberation movement. Aid from the United States has been used "to buy weapons to kill patriots," he says, and "that country is prepared for direct military intervention." The 1,800-word second part of the article, published in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 15 January on page 3, describes events since November 1980. The situation of violence and confusion is seen as giving the United States a pretext for further intervention, including making changes in the ruling junta. The United States is seen to be "alarmed" by "patriots'" victories against intervening forces from Guatemala and Honduras, to which it has reacted by resuming military aid to El Salvador. The author concludes by wondering how President Reagan will approach El Salvador. [LD201229 Editorial Report]

MILITARY PAPER ON U.S. POLICY--Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 January 1981 carries on page 3 a 1,900-word article by candidate of historical sciences A. Krutskikh entitled "Partnership in the Name of Aggression: New Trends in U.S. Bloc Policy," discussing U.S. efforts to form, revive or revamp its military alliances in order to "contain communism." This policy is seen to reflect "Washington's desire to mobilize and exploit other countries' resources in the struggle against the revolutionary changes in the world and in an attack on the relaxation of tension." The article briefly notes President-Elect Reagan's reported intention to deal with the "problem of U.S. relations with its allies" in his inauguration address and proceeds to consider in turn the existing U.S. postures in relation to NATO, the supposed "Meto" allaince based on Camp David, ANZUS/ANZUK, SEATO and a putative Northeast Asia Treaty covering Japan, Taiwan and the RDK. [LD201427 Editorial Report]

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TROOP INTEGRATION EFFORTS DESCRIBED

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 1, Jan 81 signed to press 22 Dec 80 pp 21-22

[Article by Col V. Zakharchenko, inspector, Agitprop Department, main political directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy: "As a Unified Family: From Experience of Ideological Work With Warrant Officers"]

[Text] Military personnel of different nationalities serve shoulder to shoulder in the USSR Armed Forces, including warrant officers. Quality of training and indoctrination of young servicemen are in large measure determined by these warrant officers. And it is natural that indoctrination of warrant officers in a spirit of Soviet patriotism and internationalism and instilling in them respect for all nationalities and ethnic groups in our country as well as an esprit de corps is a particular concern of commanders, political workers, party and Komsomol organizations.

Positive experience in ideological work with warrant officers in this area has been amassed in some of the units in the Red-Banner Transcaucasus Military District. For example, the secretary of the party committee of one of these units, together with officers V. Shepelev and L. Kachalin, studied this question in detail and subsequently presented it for discussion by party members. A useful discussion was held, in the course of which it was noted that young representatives of many nationalities serve in the subunits, and that indoctrination of fraternal solidarity is still being conducted in a haphazard and sporadic manner in some subunits. The Communists outlined ways to correct deficiencies. First and foremost they resolved to improve the political instruction of military personnel of this category. Experienced methods specialist Maj V. Burovich was appointed to lead their group.

Becoming more closely acquainted with the students, the officer endeavored to kindle in the mind and heart of each one of them sparks of lively interest in political instruction. He did this both during personal interviews and at training classes.

The students will long remember the class at which Major Burovich read letters written by soldiers at the front to family and friends, published in the army press during those terrible years. The political instruction topic "CPSU Demands on Military Cadres. The Role of Warrant Officers in Training and Indoctrination of Personnel and Improving the Combat Readiness of the Subunit and Unit" was presented with vivid examples. Nobody could remain indifferent upon hearing the text of a letter from fellow guardsmen to the wife of soldier Sh. Ibragimov: "Dear Adli! We are comrades-in-arms of your husband Shokir Ibragimov. We have marched into battle

with the Germans shoulder to shoulder with him. Shokir is a fearless submachine gunner. He is a squad leader. Recently we were engaged in savage battle for a large Ukrainian village, like many of your villages in Turkmenia. The Germans were defending with desperate ferocity, delivering savage fire from guns, mortars and submachineguns. But brave Shokir does not fear death! He killed 13 fascist invaders in this battle. We kept possession of the village. Be proud of your husband, Adia! Tell your fellow countrymen about his brave deeds."

Hearing this letter by the guardsmen was a moving experience for the group of trainees. The discussion, begun by the leader, was continued by Warrant Officer I. Aliyev.

"The words spoken by Mikhail Ivanovich Kalinin that the friendship among the peoples of the Soviet Union amazed everybody abroad -- both our friends and our foes -- are partfcularly dear to m y heart, as an Azerbaijani. This friendship has been tempered, just like steel, in the most severe tests."

Warrant officer Aliyev's statement was backed up by Warrant Officer M. Kimaziyev, a native of Uzbekistan: "Dozens of my fellow countrymen became Heroes of the Soviet Union during the war years. Thousands upon thousands of the finest sons and daughters of our multinational homeland received this, our country's highest honor. We owe our good fortune to them. Men of more than 10 nationalities are serving in this unit today. In our group there are Azerbaijani, Ukrainians, Russians, and Georgians. The friendship among our peoples is our most precious achievement. Herein lies our strength and invincibility! For we are children of a single motherland. And it is our duty to defend it as sons should do."

In the course of the class the students shared their work experience in training and indoctrinating personnel and in forming in their subordinates excellent moral-fighting qualities and a feeling of friendship and esprit de corps. Warrant Officer A. Amlukhanov wr[illegible] a paper, an assignment given him by the group leader, on the topic "The 25[illegible] CPSU Congress on Indoctrination of Military Personnel in a Spirit of Friendship Among the Soviet Peoples, Patriotism and Socialist Internationalism." He subsequently used this paper as a basis for a speech in the subunit.

Preparing for the class on this topic, the warrant officers studied and made an outline of V. I. Lenin's "Critical Comments on the Nationalities Question," V. I. Lenin's letter "To Comrade Communists of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia, Dagestan, and the Gorskaya Republic," and others. It is not surprising that the students displayed profound knowledge at the seminar.

Such an approach to the political training of warrant officers, this most important form of indoctrination, is characteristic of the majority of the unit's political workers.

Agitprop groups plan an active role in internationalist indoctrination of personnel, including warrant officers. In the unit in which officer V. Balyukov serves, arrangements were made for the most highly qualified propagandists to address the warrant officers on current political topics. Then the idea was presented to establish a warrant officer lecture agency attached to the garrison officers' club. At the first session officer V. Farfilov spoke on the subject "Friendship and Brotherhood of the Peoples of the USSR -- Source of the Might of This Country and

the USSR Armed Forces." He thoroughly discussed Leninist theses on the nationalities question and demonstrated with concrete examples the significance of solidarity among military personnel of different nationalities in daily military life.

Officer N. Gadzhiyev presented a lecture entitled "Internationalist Character of the Armed Defense of Socialism." Also outstanding was a lecture by officer Ye. Dobrovol'skiy on the topic "Indoctrination of Military Personnel in a Spirit of Soviet Patriotism and Internationalism -- Most Important Task of Commanders of All Echelons." A series of lectures was also presented by officers D. Skvortsov, Kh. Khaletsev, V. Belotserkovskiy and others.

Unit propagandists took as a guide to action the CPSU Central Committee decree entitled "On Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Indoctrination Work" and the conclusion that forming in Soviet citizens a scientific-philosophical outlook, total dedication to the cause of the party, Communist ideals, love of the socialist homeland, and proletarian internationalism has been and remains the heart of ideological and political indoctrination work. They are guided by this thesis in their daily activities.

Various forms of ideological work are employed to accomplish the assigned task. In particular, the following morning activities are popular with the warrant officers: "The Region in Which You Serve," "By a Map of Our Homeland," "I Am a Citizen of the Soviet Union," and "My Homeland Is the USSR." Presentation of these activities takes into account the multinational composition of the audience and the character of the men's service duties.

In one of the district's units, for example, a specific-topic morning activity entitled "Soviet Azerbaijan in 60 Years of Soviet Rule" was prepared and presented for the warrant officers, one out of every three of whom is an Azerbaijani. Personnel from other nationalities were also invited to this activity. The men were addressed by a political worker and representatives of local party organizations. Komsomol activists selected and presented excerpts from feature and documentary films, an exhibit of books, and a wired, illuminated map of new construction projects in the republic, graphically showing the successes of the Azerbaijani people achieved with the assistance of this country's brother peoples during the years of Soviet rule. The event was highly successful.

Cultural and educational establishments greatly assist commanders and political workers in performing the tasks of internationalist indoctrination of military personnel, including warrant officers. Lecture agencies for warrant officers, entitled "Indissoluble Union of Free Republics" [first line of Soviet National Anthem], have been organized under the auspices of the Tbilisi, Baku and other officers' clubs. Lectures are presented by officials from local party organizations, propagandists, and unit commanders. Addresses by R. Goglidze, First Secretary of the Zavodskoy Rayon Party Committee in the city of Tbilisi, and O. Gurgenidze, a lecturer from that same rayon committee, who acquaint the men with the achievements of the rayon and republic in achieving the targets of the five-year plan, are highly successful, for example.

In propagandizing Leninist nationalities policy, strengthening of the friendship among the peoples of the USSR, and solidarity of military collectives, commanders and political agencies skillfully utilize the possibilities of unit combat glory rooms, museums, as well as the museum dedicated to the history of the troops of this district.

Get-togethers between young warrant officers and command officers directly at the museum, where they become acquainted with the history of the unit and its fighting traditions, has become traditional in one of the units. This museum carefully preserves relics of combat glory, and personnel are well acquainted with the names of Heroes of the Soviet Union who have served in the unit, and who include Russians, Ukrainians, Azerbaijani, Georgians, and Armenians. There is a council operating under the auspices of the museum. Council activists include warrant officers M. Akhmedov, I. Razumnyy, and T. Khanbabayev. Together with other military personnel and Komsomol activists, they do a great deal of work in the area of internationalist indoctrination not only of young soldiers but also of those who are preparing to become defenders of the homeland.

In the course of get-togethers and lectures, commanders and political workers use persuasive examples to reveal the sources of friendship among the Soviet peoples and demonstrate how it was tempered in the flame of battle, in joint struggle, and strengthened by the blood of sons who gave their lives for the homeland.

Warrant officers M. Prasolov, I. Razumnyy, and D. Stepanyan, veterans of the Great Patriotic War, have also become active propagandists of the Leninist nationalities policy.

The efforts of commanders, political workers and activists are not in vain. The men of this unit are continuing with concrete deeds the traditions of the older generations. Take, for example, the tank company under the command of Sr Lt I. Yakushkin. It has been named the unit's best company on the basis of the year's performance results. Men of nine nationalities serve in this company. The source of their success is friendship and military comradeship. It is appropriate at this point to recall the words spoken by L. I. Brezhnev on the army: "Our army is also a special army in the sense that it is a school of internationalism, a school of indoctrination of feelings of brotherhood, solidarity and mutual respect on the part of all nationalities and ethnic groups in the Soviet Union."

Such traits as dedication to the cause of communism, profound internationalism and Soviet patriotism are characteristic of Soviet military personnel, who represent all nationalities. Improvement of all work aimed at indoctrination of personnel, including warrant officers, in a spirit of friendship among the peoples of the USSR and socialist internationalism will promote further enhancement of the educational role of the USSR Armed Forces and achievement of additional success in strengthening combat readiness and in competition to honor the 26th CPSU Congress in a worthy fashion.

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NEW HARD-HITTING TELEVISION FEATURE UNMASKS BUREAUCRATS

Tbilisi KOMUNISTI in Georgian 8 Jan 81 p 4

[Unattributed article: "Bureaucrat on the Screen...Who's Next?!"]

[Text] Recently, PRAVDA wrote:

"Active intervention in life--such is the main principle guiding Georgian television's best programming!"

Pretty high praise!

"Militant television"--that's what the people have been calling our blue screen these days.

Uncompromising battle against any and all vices--bribery, money-grubbing, embezzlement, stealing from the state, from the people. Letters to the editor have doubled recently. More and more often now you hear the phrase "our television..."

Now from the blue screen comes the strong, ringing call: Fight Bureaucratism!

Bureaucratism is like a swamp: easy to get into, hard to get out of!

Bureaucratism is like a time bomb--it works silently but has the destructive force of a volcano!

A bureaucrat can be big or little, from a residential building manager to a high-placed ministry official! On 4 November, in a big broadcast against bureaucratism, television promised the viewer:

"We have opened a new gallery, called Bureaucrats' Gallery. Our faceless, verbal gallery has not been enough. Now we're going to show you their pictures."

And so, on 5 January television kept its promise to the viewer. The gallery's first exhibit appeared on the screen.

Teimuraz Kvirkvelia!

He is Ordzhonikidze Rayon telephone exchange chief; his own telephone number is 36-27-41.

It comes as no surprise to our readers!

On 6 January the screen came to life with a new exhibit for the Bureaucrats' Gallery--this time Guram Odishvili, director of Tbilisi's Fashion Footwear factory.

Neither did this come as any surprise to our readers.

Last night, 7 January, the voice of poet N. Dzhalagonia was heard from the television set, addressing a bureaucrat:

What is a bigger sin
Than to trash a man's soul,
To rob Soviet citizens
Of love and beauty!

These television spots were undoubtedly harsh. But they were also infused with the greatest respect for the working people. They were in full accord with the urgent tasks outlined by our party's Central Committee and the demands declared from the high forum of Tbilisi's 38th Party Conference.

Georgian television has opened an interesting gallery. A bureaucrat is on the screen...who's next?

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March 20, 1981